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In the process industry, there are uncertainties associated with each variable, which might 
lead to process deviations and hazards. In order to accurately quantify the risks associated 
with these hazard scenarios, quantitative probability should be calculated. The process 
dynamically changes during plant operation, which requires continuous monitoring of 
process risks and real time safety verification. It is challenging to both dynamically and 
instantaneously estimate the risks for all faults and deviations. An FSN is introduced in 
this thesis to systematically and continuously estimate risks for all possible fault 
propagation scenarios.  
Intelligent reasoning algorithms are proposed using a BBN to accurately estimate risks. 
An FSN is used to analyze causes and consequences of different faults using automated 
forward and backward propagation learning techniques. Real time safety verification is 
applied to each fault propagation scenario. The TE process is used to illustrate the 
proposed real time safety verification. An FDS experimental setup is used to study real 
life data. 
 
Key Words: Fault Semantic Network (FSN); Process Object Oriented Methodology 
(POOM); Bayesian Belief Network (BBN); Tennessee Eastman (TE) process; Fault 





Table of Contents 
 Page 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... iv 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Previous Accidents 3 
1.2. Motivation 6 
1.3. Problem Definition 7 
1.4. Objectives 8 
1.5. The Innovative Contributions of this Study 9 
1.6. Solution Approach 10 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................ 12 
2.1. P&ID Modelling 12 
2.2. Pattern Identification of Faults 15 
2.3. Techniques of Fault Modelling 19 
2.4. Probabilistic Approach in Fault Identification 20 
2.5. Dynamic Risk Estimation 23 
Chapter 3: Methodology ................................................................................................... 29 
3.1. Modelling From P&ID to Process Object Oriented Methodology 30 
3.1.1. Creation of the Equipment Class 32 
3.1.2. Instantiation of the Plant Equipment Object 34 
3.1.3. Topology Setup 35 
3.1.4. Class Definition for Plant Materials 35 
3.1.5. Management of the POOM Knowledgebase 36 
3.2. Fault Propagation Modelling with a Static FSN 36 
3.2.1. Failure Mode Class of Plant Equipment 37 
3.2.2. Modelling Class of Causes and Consequences 37 
3.2.3. Plant Equipment Linkage to Failure Mode 38 
3.2.4. Plant Level Fault Propagation Scenarios 38 
3.2.5. Risk Estimation 39 
3.2.6. Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 39 
3.3. Mapping Independent Protection Layers to the FSN 41 
vi 
 
3.3.1. Equipment Failure Mode 42 
3.3.2. Independent Protection Layer (IPL) 42 
3.3.3. Linking a Fault Propagation Scenario to an IPL 44 
3.4. Calculation of Dynamic Probability and Updating the FSN 44 
3.4.1. Priori Data 45 
3.4.2. Posteriori Data 45 
3.4.3. The Bayesian Belief Network 46 
3.4.4. Updating the Fault Semantic Network 50 
Chapter 4: Case Study ....................................................................................................... 53 
4.1. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) 53 
4.2. Process Modelling and Simulation 55 
4.3. Fault Simulation of the TE Process 63 
4.4. Real Time FSN Simulation 71 
Chapter 5: System Design & Implementation .................................................................. 75 
5.1. Proposed System Architecture 77 
5.2. The TE Process / Fault / Hazard / Accident Data Acquisition 80 
5.3. Implementation of the FSN 82 
Chapter 6: Evaluation and Results .................................................................................... 85 
6.1. The Static FSN of the TE Process 86 
6.2. The Mapping of the IPL to the FSN 90 
6.3. The Dynamic FSN and Safety Verification of the TE Process 92 
6.3.1. Hazard Identification 95 
6.3.2. Risk Estimation and Evaluation 97 
6.3.3. Safety Verification 102 
6.3.4. Risk Reduction 104 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work ........................................................................ 106 
7.1. Potential Applications 108 
7.1.1. Risk Calculation 108 
7.1.2. Safety Performance Indicator 109 
7.1.3. Applications in Automated Hazard Identification 109 
7.2. Future Work 110 
7.2.1. Application of Automated hazard Identification on Hydrogen Production 
Processing Plant CU-Cl Cycle 111 
References ...................................................................................................................... 112 
vii 
 
Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 121 
A. List of Abbreviations 121 
B. Nomenclature 123 
C. Glossary 126 
D. Fault Diagnostic System 128 
E. Additional Plots of the FDS Data 136 
F. Sample MATLAB® Program 142 
G. Sample FSN Macro 143 








List of Figures 
 Page 
Figure 1.1: LNG Plant, Ras Lafan, Qatar 1 
Figure 1.2: Fire extinguisher plant explosion in Kansas City, Missouri 4 
Figure 1.3: Four objectives of the research 8 
Figure 2.1: An example of propagation of a fault to an accident 23 
Figure 3.1: Methodology 29 
Figure 3.2: Modelling from P&ID to POOM 30 
Figure 3.3: The POOM Methodology 31 
Figure 3.4: Creation of a FSN Database using the POOM Structure 32 
Figure 3.5: Class identification 33 
Figure 3.6: Instantiation of the Plant Equipment Object 34 
Figure 3.7: Fault propagation modelling with a static FSN 37 
Figure 3.8: An example of an FSN 40 
Figure 3.9: Mapping IPL to the FSN 41 
Figure 3.10: Independent Layers of Protection 43 
Figure 3.11: Calculating dynamic probability and updating the FSN 45 
Figure 3.12:  The BBN Learning and Inference Process 46 
Figure 3.13: The BBN for fault diagnosis 48 
Figure 3.14: A typical fault propagation scenario in a typical process industry 51 
Figure 4.1: A simplified version of the TE Process 54 
Figure 4.2: The TE Process 57 
Figure 4.3: The TE Process interface in LabVIEW® 64 
Figure 4.4: Insertion of disturbances and the relationships between variables 
with disturbances and the affected variables 65 
Figure 4.5: The result of a diagnostic query 66 





  Page 
Figure 4.7: Measured variable-7 Reactor pressure 68 
Figure 4.8: Reactor coolant flow 69 
Figure 4.9: Reactor temperature 71 
Figure 4.10: Relationships between causes and consequences in the 
LabVIEW® simulation 72 
Figure 4.11: The parameters in the MATLAB® Simulink® simulation file 73 
Figure 5.1: Tree structure of a Semantic Network 75 
Figure 5.2: Class level and equipment level deviations 77 
Figure 5.3: Proposed system architecture for failure, fault, hazard and 
accident data acquisition 78 
Figure 5.4: Relationships between different databases, between databases 
and programs and between different programs 79 
Figure 5.5: Proposed data acquisition model 81 
Figure 5.6: An example of relationships between tables 82 
Figure 5.7: User interface can be used to change parameters 83 
Figure 5.8: User interface can be used to generate consequences 84 
Figure 6.1: Causes and consequences of the event Insufficient Pressure 87 
Figure 6.2: Causes and consequences of the event No Liquid Delivered 88 
Figure 6.3: Causes and consequences of the event Pump Leakage 89 
Figure 6.4: Mapping of IPLs in the TE process 91 
Figure 6.5: Fault propagation scenario of high temperature 92 
Figure 6.6: An EWMA plot for the data set with the UCL and the LCL 95 
Figure 6.7: Risk associated with Path-1 99 
Figure 6.8: Fault Propagation Scenario, Path-2 100 
Figure 6.9: Risk associated with Path-3 101 
Figure 6.10: Individual Fault Propagation Scenario for Path-4 101 





  Page 
Figure 6.12: Safety verification for upstream pipe blockage 104 
Figure 6.13: Risk Reduction Process 105 
Figure 7.1: Hydrogen Production process Cu-Cl Cycle 111 
Figure D.1: An experimental setup of an FDS in ESCL 128 
Figure D.2: Location of the sensors and other equipment of the experimental 
setup ESCL 129 
Figure D.3: Temperature change of different components and variation of 
level & flow of water 130 
Figure D.4: Temperature profile of different components during the 
experiment 131 
Figure D.5: Ralationships between the temperatures of different components 132 
Figure D.6: Normal probability plot 134 
Figure D.7: Temperature of tank-1, predicted based on temperature of tank-2 136 
Figure E.1: Temperature profile of different components and water levels in 
the tanks, data set-1 137 
Figure E.2: Variation of water level in the tanks and temperature profile of 
components, data set-2 138 
Figure E.3: Temperature changes in different components and variation of 
level & flow of water, data set-3 139 
Figure E.4: Temperature changes of different components and variation of 
level & flow of water, data set-4 139 
Figure E.5: Temperature change of different components and variation of 
level & flow of water, data set-5 140 
Figure E.6: Temperature change of different components and variation of 
level & flow of water, data set-6 141 
Figure E.7: Temperature variation of different components and change of 






List of Tables 
  Page 
Table 1.1: Ten major accidents occurred in the process industries 5 
Table 3.1: Composition of Inconel-600 35 
Table 3.2: Physical properties of Inconel-600 36 
Table 4.1: Physical Properties of the Components 56 
Table 4.2: Operating mode of the TE Process 58 
Table 4.3: Measured variables in the TE Process 59 
Table 4.4: Variables manipulated by the TE Process 60 
Table 4.5: Disturbances in TE Process 61 
Table 4.6: Probability of dependency 69 
Table 6.1: Historical tank temperature data 93 
Table 6.2: Determination of Severity, Occurrence and Detection 97 
Table 6.3: Failure Rate 98 
Table D.1: Regression Summary 133 
Table D.2: Analysis of Variance 133 











Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Accidents in process industry might be the result of deviations of process variables, 
which are the state variables that are related to the plant equipment and physical model. 
The process variables for an assembly are the combined state variables of all of the 
components of that assembly. The proper fault propagation modelling can be achieved by 
linking process variables to plant physical models. From critical fault propagation 
scenarios accidents are developed. In order to properly model fault propagation scenarios 
with detailed process variable definitions, it is important to understand the accident 
scenarios occurred in the past. 
Accidents are very common in oil and gas processing facilities. About 20 billion U.S. 
dollars are lost in the oil and gas industry every year (Venkatsubramanian, Regaswamy, 
Yin & Kavuri, 2003a) because of damage from accidents or lost revenues because of lost 
production from process deviation.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: LNG Plant, Ras Lafan, Qatar (Hydrocarbons Technology) 
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Over the years, engineers and researchers have focused on improving industrial processes 
to increase their efficiency. These efforts led to efficient industrial processes and 
improved products, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This progress has advantages, 
which increase the complexity of industrial processes and make them more complicated. 
Besides the increase in process complexity, monitoring and control approaches of process 
industries have to be updated. Processes that were controlled manually by operators 
through a simple procedure now have to be controlled automatically through complex 
procedures. The complexity of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) processing plant can be 
seen in Figure 1.1. 
An increase in system complexity poses another potential risk of hazards because of the 
complex monitoring and control systems. Significant research has been done in the area 
of hazard identification and safety system design. Recent technologies and automation 
are the key players to achieve such progress. Although on the one hand, these 
technologies have advantages such as efficient productivity, lower cost of production, 
high quality of product, on the other hand, they increase the complexity of process 
systems. Complex systems have more chances to be subjected to faults and hazardous 
conditions. Any of these may result in costly and serious incidents or accidents such as 
explosion, plant shutdown, and injuries.  
Faults in plant equipment have the potential to affect the performance of the entire 
process. Even minor faults might lead to a serious disruption in the whole process. 
Therefore, considering the fault propagations seems necessary in process industries, 
especially those that deal with continuous processes, where many process variables and 
hazardous materials such as chemical and petroleum industries, have to be dealt with,.  
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Recent technologies focus on controlling and monitoring processes, and modelling 
system dynamics, as well as predicting their behaviour and the relationships among 
process variables. This approach provides a means to detect abnormal events at early 
stages by understanding the relationship among process variables and their impact on 
fault propagation scenarios. These targets are achievable through an accurate fault 
propagation analysis, which results in a successful fault diagnosis. Given this, controlling 
and monitoring of process operation to implement a well-designed fault diagnosis 
technique is among the most important concerns in process industries. 
 
1.1. Previous Accidents 
 
In the United States of America (USA), 4,693 people died from industrial accidents in 
2011 (OSHA, 2013), an average of 13 people per day. Approximately five people died 
every working day in the workplace from 1993 to 2005 in Canada (CBC, 2006). This is 
the situation of two of the most developed countries. As illustrated in Table 1.1, the 
situation in the developing world is much more extreme. Accidents and fatalities are not 
commonly reported to the authorities in those countries. Devastation from industrial 





Figure 1.2: Fire extinguisher plant explosion in Kansas City, Missouri (Braindrips) 
 
Ten selected previous major accidents in regard to death tolls in the process industry are 
summarized in Table 1.1. The accidents are categorized according to the number of death 
tolls. 
In terms of death toll, Bopal was the worst industrial disaster in the history of mankind. 
On the night of December 2-3, 1984, a storage tank containing 45 tons of Methyl 
Isocyanate (MIC) (Grazian-Archive, 2010) exploded, releasing a plume of highly toxic 
gas. Approximately 4,000 people died in a few minutes (BBC, NCBI, Person, 2009). 
Within a few days, thousands more died. 
Factors leading to the magnitude of the gas leak mainly included problems such as: 
storing MIC in large tanks and filling them beyond recommended levels; poor overall 
maintenance, leading to failure of several safety systems; and safety systems switched off 
to save money including the MIC tank refrigeration system, which could have mitigated 
the severity of the disaster. 
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Table 1.1: Ten major accidents occurred in the process industries 
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Other factors identified are: undersized safety devices; the dependence on manual 
operations; reduction of safety management; insufficient maintenance; and inadequate 
emergency action plans (BBC, NCBI, Peterson, 2009). 
The second worst industrial accident happened in Bangladesh on April 24, 2013. A total 
of 1,127 lives perished in the accident and thousands more became disabled (BBC, CBS, 
CBC, Global, CTV news, 2013). Reuters (2013) reported the death toll as 1,131. Even 
though it was an industrial accident, it is not included in the table because the accident 
did not occur in the process system. The building housing the companies collapsed. The 





The top priorities of any plant process include implementation of a successful, 
productive, and safe operation. Higher efficiency at a lower cost of production and 
reduction of hazards are the ultimate targets. These goals are only achievable under well-
controlled and well-monitored process operations. Implementing an efficient monitoring, 
hazard identification and fault diagnosis system makes it possible to reduce the undesired 
and sudden events that may result in catastrophic accidents or disasters. 
In early 1980s, different techniques were introduced in order to implement fault diagnosis 
and hazard identification for chemical processes (Kalantarnia, 2010). These techniques 
included Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP). Although 
these techniques are implemented in different industries around the world, minor and 
major accidents are still occurring because of their limitations, such as low accuracy of 
diagnosis, mainly because of lack of accuracy in fault propagation analysis and slow 
response time. Moreover, these techniques have to be implemented by operators whose 
skills and knowledge may not be adequate to monitor process plant and understand faulty 
conditions. Therefore, human errors are also considered as the main causes of many 
faults and hazard scenarios in the process industry, where more attention is required.  
Accurate and quantitative fault propagation analysis is the basis of successful fault 
diagnosis, which is a challenging and difficult task because there are many parameters 
that are involved and that may affect the accuracy of diagnosis. These parameters include 
types of alarm equipment, their response time, quality, sufficiency of obtained process 
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data and the time delay in faults. Given this information, implementing an intelligent 
fault propagation analysis that overcomes the limitations and enhances fault diagnosis 
and hazard identification seems to be a necessity and concern of industries.  
A predictive control and monitoring system which includes developing real-time fault 
propagation analysis and an automated solution for the process industry, is under 
development at the Energy Safety and Control Laboratory (ESCL) at the University of 
Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT) in Oshawa, Canada. 
 
1.3. Problem Definition 
 
The current risk estimation is performed on a case-by-case basis, and not in real time. 
There is no solution to map safety and protection systems with fault propagation 
scenarios in real-time basis. There is no link between simulation and real-time plant 
systems, where it is difficult to predict fault propagation scenarios of new or unknown 
cases. 
Safety verification is a key success factor for safe operation in the process industry. There 
are many challenges to achieve real time safety verification where fault propagation 
prediction and analysis is the main issue. In order to have an accurate safety verification 
technique, it is important to understand all possible faults and hazards in the process 
industry and how faults propagate. In addition, it is important to map safety protection 
layers to fault propagation scenarios in order to understand how protection layers will be 





The overall objective of this thesis is to develop an FSN to simulate real time and risk 
based accident forecasting and verify the calculated probability of risk against the 
reliability data. It is to enable the user with an early understanding of process deviations 
and link the deviations with possible accident scenarios. The final product will be a 
program developed across multiple platforms. In this program, a fault modelling 
technique will be presented to design causation-models to estimate safety measures for 
each operational step and process model element and validated with process conditions. 
The four objectives of this research are shown in Figure 1.4, and described as follows: 
 Develop an FSN for selected case study to map quantitative risk estimation 
with fault propagation scenarios 
 Conduct safety and protection system modelling and mapping to an FSN 
 Dynamic risk estimation with real time process data and updating an FSN 
using a BBN 
 Conduct real time safety verification of different fault propagation scenarios 
 
 




1.5. The Innovative Contributions of This Study 
 
The main aim of this research work is to develop a safety-related framework which 
would help prevent accidents. In order to demonstrate the viability of the developed 
system, different experimental and real world datasets are used. The main contributions 
of this study are summarized as follows: 
 A literature review has been conducted on approximately 30 research studies to 
analyse the existing methodologies and to determine their shortcomings in order 
to bridge the gap; 
 The FSN method is a new approach that can provide the dynamic safety 
verification that could not be implemented using the traditional techniques of 
FTA / ETA or other methods shown in the literature review; 
 The main contribution in this work is the design of the FSN knowledge structure, 
and the development of an automated solution and algorithms to generate a static 
FSN for a given plant process using P&ID data; 
 Intelligent algorithms are developed to generate a dynamic FSN based on the 
dynamic risk estimation for all given fault propagation scenarios; 
 Programs are developed to implement these proposed algorithms for static and 
dynamic FSNs based on a proposed integrated framework, which is presented in 
this thesis; 
 Initial development of two programs, FSN and ESN, has been conducted; 
 
The concept of an FSN is first applied to a simple problem. This program will be later 
applied to more complex problems and the database will be enriched with complex data. 
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The development of the complete database and the FSN program will take at least a 
decade’s effort to implement. In this research, the foundation for future research has been 
laid. 
 
1.6. Solution Approach  
 
 Model a case study process using POOM 
 Analyze a fault propagation model using the FSN 
 Process a data analysis and feature extraction from real time / process simulation 
data 
 Model IPL with the FSN 
 Estimate the dynamic risk using intelligent probabilistic methodology 
 
The organization of rest of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2: In chapter 2, related literature on fault detection and semantic networks are 
discussed. The use of evolutionary and conventional approaches for fault diagnosis in the 
research literature, along with techniques for decision support and prognostics, are also 
discussed. 
Chapter 3: In chapter 3, methodologies of this research are discussed. In this chapter 
from PI&D modelling to risk verification are reviewed in different steps of static and 
dynamic FSN. The Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is also reviewed. 
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Chapter 4: In chapter 4, a case study is presented. In the case study, the Tennessee 
Eastman Process simulation is used to verify the implementation of the four steps of the 
methodology.  
Chapter 5: In chapter 5, different steps of system design and implementation using FSN 
are discussed. System architecture, database structure, arrangements of tables, and 
attributes of tables are also discussed. 
Chapter 6: The evaluation of the methodology, case study, and system design is 
summarized in this chapter. The results from the simulation are also discussed. 
Chapter 7: This chapter presents conclusions, related and future works. 
Summary: In this chapter, introduction and background about the research work are 
described. In addition, research objectives, motivation, and organization of the thesis are 
presented. In the following chapter, a literature review will be analyzed in detail. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, previous literary works, which are relevant to the subject matter of the 
dissertation research, are summarized. In most cases, these citations present formative 
works in the literature, or present articles that were points of controversy and led to 
current research paradigms and conventions. Where direct relevance to the current 
research exists, or where the current research directly builds upon or borrows from prior 
research, appropriate citations are made in the accompanying texts. Commentary on the 
conventions adopted in this research is presented as and when necessary, and often 
includes citations of existing literature extending those comments. 
There is no literature published on FSN except Gabbar (2010) which was later re-written 
by Gabbar in 2012. But there is a significant amount of literature on semantic networks. 
Different literary works related to FSN are reviewed in this chapter. 
 
2.1. P&ID Modelling 
 
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) modelling of the case study was performed 
by the other research group in the FSN project. As P&ID modelling is an integrated part 
of FSN, five previous research works are reviewed. 
Puttre (1993) discussed the effect of fluid flow though piping and how software can 
model and predict the future failure of valve opening or closing events. Piping design 
consists of planning the number of sections and components required to move the desired 
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material. The basic steps for designing and analyzing piping and components do not vary 
significantly even though no two piping systems are exactly the same. Puttre suggested 
that one of the more difficult aspects of piping analysis involves anticipating the effects 
of nonlinear events on the system. Nonlinear analysis of events such as water hammer 
and steam hammer, where interference in the flow carries shock waves through the pipes, 
and fast valve opening events, would be nearly impossible to perform in a timely manner 
using manual methods. Piping software has enabled most engineering firms to analyze 
nonlinear effects.  
Huitt (2007) reviewed how to design and install piping and other instruments, fault and 
leak free. He also discussed how to prevent future possibility of fire from sparks from 
static charge accumulation. Furthermore, he recommended that it might be difficult to 
predetermine what fluid services and systems would be candidates for charge 
accumulation prevention and electrostatic discharge protection. The simplest and most 
conservative answer is to assume that all fluid services in lined pipe systems are 
susceptible. Therefore, it can be declared that a company’s pipe specifications need to 
reflect a global resolution that will affect all installations. 
Pohjola (2003) showed how process design can be viewed as a design project represented 
at the highest level of abstraction as a composite of three mutually communicating 
objects representing management activity, base level (design) activity, and the process. 
Each of the three objects, and all the sub-objects, which disaggregate or decompose to, 
have the same attribute list: purpose, structure, state, and performance. The generic list of 
attributes has important consequences. First, it unifies the representation of reality and 
thus makes possible and facilitates knowledge integration across disciplines. This also 
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makes it possible to build holistic models. Second, it solves the question of what 
properties should be specified for each object generated in order for the specification to 
be complete.  
The holistic model of a process, as presented by Pohjola (2003) includes specifications of 
all the four attributes of a process. Under Process Purpose, the designer makes explicit 
the list of performance criteria. These are the criteria against which he commits himself 
to assess performance each time the structure and state are updated. This is how safety as 
an item in the list of performance criteria becomes explicitly included in the model. 
Being just an item in a list is not sufficient. To assess process performance against safety, 
the features, which have an effect on safety performance, must be found under Process 
Structure and State. This is possible only by including environment into the structural 
parts of process. 
During the design project and also after the process has been built, the specifications of 
the attributes change, as previously discussed in the paper. This is why a model should be 
capable of representing a process over its lifespan. It should be possible especially in 
design, to prescribe the process at all the different levels of abstraction as the project 
advances. This feature has been taken into account by representing process as one of the 
three mutually communicating objects called design cycle. The same construct applies for 
representing control, operation, and maintenance activities during process operation.  
Alha and Pohjola (1995) stated that the conceptual stage of process design is the most 
crucial component of the overall design process because the decisions made at this phase 
have a disproportionately large share of impact than later phases. A methodology for the 
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conceptual stage of the chemical process design has been presented in Pohjola et al. (as 
cited in Alha & Pohjola, 1995) and Alha and Pohjola (as cited in Alha & Pohjola, 1995). 
This study aims at testing the design strategy suggested in the methodology and the 
performance driven design strategy (Pohjola & Alha 1994). A combined method for 
eliciting expert knowledge from verbal data was developed for constructing a descriptive 
cognitive model of a design process. The method has its basis in the connectionist view 
of information processing and it utilizes parallel distributed computing; e.g. neural 
networks. 
Addis (1992) observed that, apart from work conducted in the area of some expert 
systems, there has been little discussion of the problems of storing the knowledge used by 
engineering designers. It is often assumed that this comprises only the knowledge of 
engineering science in conjunction with a certain inner 'feel' for materials and system 
behaviour. Addis argued that the knowledge of how to design is different from these and 
merits a separate identity, with its own epistemology and philosophy. The idea of the 
'design procedure' is introduced as the means by which certain engineering design 
knowledge and skill can be stored, communicated, learned, researched, and given its own 
history independent of engineering science. 
 
2.2. Pattern Identification of Faults 
 
Burk, Chappell, Gregory, Joslyn, and McGrath (2012) discussed pattern discovery using 
a semantic network analysis in their research. In their opinion cognitive information 
processing at higher conceptual levels requires a computational approach to knowledge 
16 
 
representation and analysis. Semantic network analysis bridges the gap between 
probabilistic pattern recognition techniques and symbolic representations by replacing 
cumbersome and computationally complex forms of logic-based semantic inference that 
is common in symbolic approaches with mathematical metrics on graph representations 
of labelled, directed semantic networked data. These metrics in turn support assessment 
of evidentiary support for the presence of patterns of interest in which entities play 
specified roles in complex event scenarios. The resulting system allows patterns to be 
specified at higher levels of conceptual abstraction, while also remaining robust to 
conflicting and incomplete information. 
Zanoli and Astolfi (2012) presented the results concerning the detection and isolation of a 
break of the thrust bearing in a multi-shaft centrifugal compressor. From the inspection of 
historical data, there is clear evidence that, without the use of a diagnostic tool that assists 
the process engineer operations to recognize the true fault, it is not trivial unless its 
effects are not appreciable. This delayed detection/isolation may generate considerable 
economic loss damage and/or cause undesirable wear of the system. In the present 
research work, fault detection is approached by a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
model-free technique, while a Fuzzy Faults Classifier (FFC), as proposed in a previous 
work by Zanoli, Barboni and Astolfi (as cited in Zanoli and Astolfi, 2012), performs fault 
isolation. 
Furthermore, Zanoli and Astolfi showed that the probabilities are the values of the 




















































   [2.1]
 
 where 
uij = elements of the U matrix which denotes the membership degree of 
the current FSPE elements from j to centroid i 
FSPE = faults prototype vector 
k = number of centroids 
  m = fuzziness factor, m > 1, preferably 2 
  dij = Euclidean distance 
According to Zanoli and Astolfi (2012), the most effective enhancements achieved are 
related to the modification of the membership function employed in the fuzzification 
module and the use of the Mahalanobis Distance as metric for the fault recognition 
purpose. The main benefit of this metric is the possibility of taking into account the 
correlation between the data and how this sensitively increases the performances of the 
overall system. The improvements are mainly associated with the faster response for the 
true fault isolation with respect to the previous FFC module. The previous module 
required approximately a day and a half for the true fault isolation, while with the 
introduction of the new metric in less than one hour from the appearance of the symptom, 
the fault can be correctly detected and isolated. 
Ebnenasir and Cheng (2007) introduced an object analysis pattern, called the detector 
pattern, for modelling and analyzing failsafe fault-tolerance, where instances of the 
detector pattern are added to the Unified Modelling Language (UML) model of a system 
to create the UML model of its failsafe fault-tolerant version. The detector pattern also 
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provides a set of constraints for verifying the consistency of functional and fault-
tolerance requirements and the fault-tolerance of the detector pattern itself. They 
extended the formalization framework explained by McUmber and Cheng (as cited in 
Ebnenasir & Cheng, 2007) to generate the formal specifications of the UML model. 
Wang et al. (2003) have proposed a fault-pattern oriented methodology for 
semiconductor memory defect diagnostics, which greatly reduces the effort in memory 
product development and yield learning. The proposed notion of fault pattern combines 
the strengths of the conventional failure-pattern approach and the previous fault-type 
approach for easier isolation of real defects. They suggested that, as the fault patterns 
have to be customized for different products and process technologies, automation is very 
important. They have also developed a systematic procedure to explore the fault patterns, 
which includes a layout-based defect injection tool that provides very accurate results 
from realistic defect models. With the proposed approach, high-quality defect diagnostics 
can be automated.  
Mendel et al. (2008) employed signal processing and pattern recognition techniques to 
classify faults in bearings. The envelope analysis provides the feature vector used in the 
subsequent classification steps. On the contrary, with the majority of the works that focus 
on the fault detection problem, they explored pattern recognition methods to automate the 






2.3. Techniques of Fault Modelling 
 
Venkatsubramanian (2003a and 2003b) classified fault diagnosis methods in three 
categories as follow: 
 Quantitative Model-Based Methods 
 Qualitative Model-Based Methods 
 Process History-Based Methods 
However, the disadvantages that come with these methods are their limitations in 
modelling nonlinear systems and having model errors due to the simplicity of 
approximation that considerably reduces the effectiveness of these methods. 
In another study (Qian, Li, Ziang, and Wen, 2003), the researchers tried to design an 
expert system to implement a real-time fault diagnosis system using computer-aided 
techniques. When an abnormal situation arises in a process, real-time data extracted from 
sensors is stored in an online database and then the expert system reasons it to find causes 
and consequences, according to the designed knowledge base. This is similar to the work 
performed at Qian et al. (2003) and Nan, Khan and Iqbal. (2008), who studied other 
computer-aided fault diagnosis techniques. They proposed a knowledge-based fault 
diagnosis method that uses fuzzy-logic as an inference engine to reason, according to the 
extracted real-time data and knowledge base. These techniques were useful and offered 
practical ways to perform fault diagnosis. The performance of these fault diagnosis 
techniques depends on the frequency and presence of fault data, and the quality and 
accuracy of fault and hazard scenarios’ knowledge base. 
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As part of the research and work completed in the area of computer-aided fault diagnosis, 
Gelgele and Wang (1998) have developed a software prototype called EXEDS for 
application of fault diagnosis in automotive engines. The software analyzes failure 
symptoms to diagnose faults and suggests desired maintenance actions. It consists of 
knowledge base and an expert system which include a list of symptoms, diagnosis 
modules, remedies and associated rules, respectively. 
Chetouani, Mouhab, Cosmao, and Lionel (2003) have shown that, by combining the 
Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) for a nonlinear dynamic system with an innovation test, 
an efficient method for detecting faults is obtained. The detection method needs a model 
that describes the process behavior in the normal mode. Indeed, successful detection 
requires a judicious adjustment of the decision criterion, which expresses the response of 
the filter to breakdowns. 
 
2.4. Probabilistic Approach in Fault Identification 
 
Different probabilistic approaches are widely used in fault identification. The Bayesian 
Belief Network (BBN) is one of the promising probabilistic techniques that can offer an 
accurate calculation of probabilities of faults. Commonly, the BBN technique is applied 
to fault diagnosis of complex systems.  A study performed by Guzman and Kramer 
(1993) compared the BBN with rule-based expert system and showed how these two 
methods contrast with each other. An expert system consists of a knowledge base made 
of heuristic rules that demonstrate successful operation in diagnosing faults. However, 
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this has some disadvantages and limitations. The probabilistic approaches not only 
overcome these drawbacks, but also construct a logical way to reason and model the 
underlying process in order to accurately detect faults.    
Bickford and Malloy (2002) used the Bayesian approach to develop an online fault 
diagnosis software prototype to detect and diagnose faults in a turbine engine. The 
proposed software monitors and classifies the source and type of sensor, component, and 
engine faults. The proposed software provides a mathematical means to integrate data 
from multiple diagnostic instruments and algorithms in order to detect and classify faults 
in real time. 
In another similar study, Romessis, Stamatis and Mathioudakis (2001) proposed a 
method for building BBNs to diagnose faults in a gas turbine. The results show that the 
proposed method was successful in fault diagnosis with an accuracy of 96%, which 
shows the high reliability of the BBN as a probabilistic method in fault detection and 
diagnosis. Nan et al. (2008) and Kalantarnia, Khan, and Hawboldt (2010) have discussed 
the development of a probabilistic framework using the BBN to analyze faults for 
application on hazard identification. Their approach provided new features for the 
accurate prediction of faults and their propagation. 
Friedman, Geiger and Goldszmidt (1997) have analyzed the direct application of the 
Minimum Description Length (MDL) method to learning unrestricted Bayesian networks 
for classification tasks. They showed that, although the MDL method presents strong 
asymptotic guarantees, it does not necessarily optimize the classification accuracy of the 
learned networks. Their analysis suggests a class of scoring functions that may be better 
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suited to this task. These scoring functions appear to be computationally intractable. 
Friedman et al. (1997) therefore plan to explore effective approaches based on 
approximations of these scoring functions. The Bayesian theory was first introduced by 
Thomas Bayes (Bayes, 1763). The MDL scoring function is shown in the following 
paragraph, as described by Rissanen (as cited in Friedman et al. 1997). 
Let B = {G, θ} be a Bayesian network, and let D = {u1, . . .  ., uN} be a training set, where 
each ui assigns a value to all the variables in U. The MDL scoring function of a network 
B given a training data set D, written MDL(B|D), is given by 
 
[2.2] 
where |B| is the number of parameters in the network (Friedman et al., 1997). 
 
The main contribution of the work of Friedman et al. (1997) is the experimental 
evaluation of the Tree-Augmented Naive Bayesian (TAN) classifiers, and the multinet 
classifier as described by Chow and Liu (as cited in Friedman et al. 1997), which is 
termed as CL hereafter. It is clear that, in some situations, it would be useful to model 
correlations among attributes that cannot be captured by a tree structure (or collections of 
tree structures). Such models will be preferable when there are enough training instances 
to robustly estimate higher-order conditional probabilities. Still, both TAN and CL 
multinets embody a good trade-off between the quality of the approximation of 
correlations among attributes and the computational complexity in the learning stage. The 
learning procedures are guaranteed to find the optimal tree structure, and, as their 






classification methods in machine learning. Therefore, Friedman et al. (1997) proposed 
them as worthwhile tools for the machine learning community. 
Qian, Li, Jiang and Wen (2005) proposed the windowed Fourier transform for fault 
detection, which monitors the change of local frequencies. The algorithm is described and 
applied to simulated and real fringes. Its sensitivity to faults and robustness against noises 
are shown in Qian et al.’s (2005) study. Comparisons to the traditional Fourier transform 
approach as well as the correlation approach are also addressed. 
 
2.5. Dynamic Risk Estimation 
 
Fault is as an abnormal condition or defect at any component, equipment, or sub-system 
level which may lead to a failure. For example, vibration of a pump is a fault which 
might cause failure of the pipelines connected to the pump, which might cause a gas leak, 
and, consequently, fire and explosion. A schematic of propagation of a fault to an 
accident is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 




Hazard may also be propagated from a process variable deviation; for example, if 
pressure which is higher than the set point in a vessel may cause a failure in the vessel 
and consequently an accident.  
Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2008) analyzed the relationship between production risk and 
nonparametric estimation. They considered an approach in which producers maximized 
the expected utility of anticipated profit to solve the input allocation problem. In contrast, 
the risk studies in the production literature those based on built-in features such as: 
i. Parametric form of the production and risk function, 
ii. Parametric form of the utility function, 
iii. Distributional assumptions on the error terms representing output risk. 
However, Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2008) stated that the nonparametric approach avoids 
all these restrictive features. The production function, the risk function i.e. the output risk, 
and risk preference function, can be estimated non-parametrically, avoiding any 
functional form assumption. Furthermore, they suggested making no distributional 
assumption on the error term representing production risk. 
Peters (2009) introduced a dynamic operational risk model which allows for significant 
flexibility in correlation structures introduced between risk profiles. A Bayesian 
framework was next established to allow inference and estimation under this model, 
whilst at the same time allowing incorporation of alternative data sources into the 
inferential procedure. A novel simulation procedure was then developed in Peters’ (2009) 
study for the Bayesian model presented, in the case of dependence between frequency 
risk profiles. Simulations were performed to demonstrate the accuracy of this procedure 
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in multiple bivariate examples. Comparisons were made between marginal estimation 
and a benchmark estimation procedure. In all simulations, the estimation of the model 
parameters was accurate and the behaviour of the estimates of the posterior mean and 
standard deviation presented, which smoothed over multiple data realizations, was as 
expected. Initially, the influence of the biased expert observation influenced the results 
and as the size of the data set for actual annual loss counts grew, the estimations 
improved in accuracy. The result showed that the joint estimation outperformed the 
marginal estimation when forming predictions of future counts and that rates in year T + 
1, given estimates based on data up to year T . A highly accurate estimation of the copula 
parameter, jointly with the model parameters, was demonstrated in Peters’ (2009) study. 
Simulations were performed in the models for the Clayton Copula model in which the 
copula parameter was also unknown. Though the simulation time was increased as a 
factor of the number of risk cells, the results and performance were as presented for the 
bivariate models, making this approach suitable for practical purposes.  
In probability theory and statistics, a copula is a kind of distribution function. Copulas are 
used to describe the dependence between random variables. They are named for their 
resemblance to grammatical copulas in linguistics. The bivariate copula model proposed 
by Clayton is called the Clayton Copula. It is one of the common bivariate copula 
models. It is also referred to as the Cook and Johnson Copula, originally studied by 
Kimeldorf and Sampson (as cited in Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). It takes the form: 
 C(µ1, µ2; θ) = (µ1−θ + µ2−θ −1)−1/θ    [2.3] 
 where 
Domain of dependence parameter θ = {θ | 0 < θ < ∞ } = (0, ∞) 
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As θ approaches zero, the marginals become independent. As θ approaches infinity, the 
copula attains the Fréchet upper bound, but for no value does it attain the Fréchet lower 
bound. The Clayton Copula cannot account for negative dependence. It has been used to 
study correlated risks because it exhibits strong left tail dependence and relatively weak 
right tail dependence (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). 
The Fréchet distribution is a special case of generalized extreme value distribution. It has 
the cumulative distribution function as follows: 
Pr (X ≤ x) = 
α−−xe   if   x > 0    [2.4] 
 where  Shape parameter:   α > 0   (Bosch, 2000) 
It can be generalized to include a location parameter and a scale parameter with the 
cumulative distribution function: 










e   if   x > m   [2.5] 
 where  Location parameter:   m = the minimum 
   Scale parameter: s > 0   (Bosch, 2000) 
Clayton Copula is explained in Appendix C. 
The main objective of Peters’ (2009) study was to present a framework for the 
multivariate problem and to demonstrate estimation in that setting. Application of the 
framework to real data could be the subject of further research. In Peters’ (2009) study, 
the estimation procedure is presented for frequencies only, but it can be extended in the 
same manner as presented to severities. 
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Simani (2003) examined the development of a comprehensive methodology for Fault 
Detection and Isolation (FDI) of dynamic systems by using a state estimation approach, 
in conjunction with residual processing schemes. The final result consists an FDI strategy 
based on fault diagnosis schemes to generate redundant residuals. The suggested method 
does not require any physical knowledge of the process under observation since, instead 
of exploiting complicated nonlinear models obtained by modelling techniques, linear 
models were obtained by means of identification schemes using Equation Error (EE) and 
Errors in Variables (EIV) models. 
In their research Kalantarnia, Khan and Hawboldt (2009) demonstrated the use of the 
Bayesian theory in Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and its application as a useful 
tool in dynamic risk assessment to prevent accidents and to enhance the overall 
performance of the system. This theory can also be used in event tree analysis and other 
techniques. 
The main purpose of this research work is to initiate a safety-related framework which 
would help in preventing accidents. While reviewing the literature, it was found that the 
root causes of all accidents are the lack of a proper safety framework. There is no proper 
framework for safety verification. Safety Standards and Verification tools are presented 
in the literature. However, proper communication among them is absent. A proper 
framework which links the initiation of a hazard, i.e. a fault, safety measures to be 
adopted to prevent the propagation of a fault, and verification, is missing in the process 
industry. Safety verification is a key success factor which distinguishes the FSN 
approach from the other approaches. It is important to map safety protection layers to 
fault propagation scenarios. Fault tree analysis (FTA) and Event tree analysis (ETA) are 
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alternative options. However they require manual intervention. Only the FSN offers the 
opportunity to automatically map the Independent Protection Layers (IPL) in real time for 
online safety verification. 
 
Summary: In this chapter, literary works by previous researchers on P&ID modelling, 
pattern identification of faults, techniques of fault modelling, the probabilistic approach 
of fault modelling, and dynamic risk estimation were reviewed.  




Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
In this chapter, the methodology of the research is discussed. The steps are shown in 
Figure 3.1. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) modelling to risk verification is 
explained in different steps of static FSN and dynamic FSN. The Bayesian Belief 
Network (BBN) is also described in this chapter. 
 
 




3.1. Modelling From P&ID to Process Object Oriented 
Methodology 
 
Initially, an FSN is constructed based on the ontology structure of fault models on the 
basis of Process Object Oriented Methodology (POOM) where Failure Mode (FM) is 
described using symptoms, enablers, variables, causes, consequences and repair actions, 
as shown in Figure 3.2. Rules are associated with each transition of the causation model 
within the FSN. The rules can be quantitative (probabilistic) or qualitative. A fault is an 
unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property or parameter of the system 
from the acceptable, usual or standard condition. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Modelling from P&ID to POOM 
 
The POOM is an object oriented approach to construct the process model in its static, 
dynamic or functional paradigms. In the static paradigm, the faults are related with the 
structures of machines, such as pumps, valves or compressors. In the dynamic paradigm, 
the faults are related with the dynamic behaviour of machines, such as over-loading, 
saturation or overheating. In the functional paradigm, the faults are related with operation 
of machines, including the start-up, shutdown or wrong operation. The basic architecture 
of the POOM is shown in Figure 3.3. The static view describes facilities, materials and 
31 
 
topologies. The Dynamic view describes the behaviour required to do necessary actions 
and the operational view describes the purpose of each structure and set of actions to 
achieve the desired functions (Gabbar, 2007) 
         
 
Figure 3.3:  The POOM Methodology (Gabbar, 2007) 
 
An instance of the FSN database using the POOM methodology is shown in Figure 3.4. 
All the tables and the fields in the database are calculated either through historical data or 
expert opinion. 
For a particular symptom, there is a corresponding semantic network: either the fuzzy 
expert system (FES) or the Bayesian belief network (BBN). The symptoms also have 





Figure 3.4: Creation of an FSN database using the POOM structure 
 
 
3.1.1. Creation of the Equipment Class 
 
Every piece of equipment has its own set of parameters, which have their own ranges of 
deviations that may cause some consequences. The same types of equipment have the 
same types of parameters and the same ranges of deviations; e.g. carbon steel pipe, 
inconel-600 pipe, and the 5 Mega Pascal (MPa) compressor. With the same parameters, 
equipment records are categorized in different classes. The classes are stored in the 
database. If an icon of equipment is dragged and dropped, all the parameters are saved in 
the database associated with the equipment and also associated with the class to which 




Figure 3.5: Class identification 
 
For example, there are different types of carbon steel; i.e. mild or low; medium; high; and 
ultra high carbon steel. For a certain category of carbon steel there is for example, a 
specific density, melting point, thermal conductivity, heat capacity, and Young’s 
Modulus. The physical and chemical properties of that material are stored as class 
properties. 
Conversely, different pipes made of carbon steel may be of different diameters, lengths 
and thicknesses as seen in Figure 3.5. The specific properties of that piece of equipment 







3.1.2. Instantiation of the Plant Equipment Object 
 
After the classes are defined, the sets of equipment are ready for drag-and-drop. When 
the pieces of equipment are dragged-and-dropped, they are automatically assigned a 
unique serial number, which contains a prefix character identifying the class category; 
e.g. “E” for equipment or “P” for pipe. The parameters of the specific equipment are 
linked in the database. For example if a pump is dragged and dropped, its class 
information is connected with parameters, such as cavitations, vibrations. The pump 
specific information, such as flow rate wattage, is stored as pump specific data. An 






























































































3.1.3. Topology Setup 
 
The pieces of equipment on the canvas are connected accordingly. As mentioned 
previously, every piece and class of equipment in a plant may have one or more probable 
faults associated with it. Each fault may have one or more associated hazards and each 
hazard may have one or more associated accident scenarios. The probabilities for the 
occurrences of faults and hazards, and the incidents of accidents as a consequence are 
calculated from the historical data. From the probabilities, the risk element is identified 
for each fault → hazard → accident propagation scenario from the root causes to the final 
consequences following the pathways in the topology. 
 
3.1.4. Class Definition for Plant Materials 
 
One of the criteria for categorization of the equipment involves defining the material of 
construction. Each material has its own physical and chemical properties. For example, 
inconel-600 has the properties shown in Table 3.1 and 3.2: 
 
Table 3.1: Composition of Inconel-600 (Specialmetals) 
Element Percentage (%) 
Nickel and Cobalt 72 minimum 
Chromium 14.0 to 17.0 
Iron 6.00 to 10.00 
Carbon 0.15 maximum 
Manganese 1.00 maximum 
Sulfur 0.015 maximum 
Silicon 0.50 maximum 
Copper 0.50 maximum 
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Table 3.2: Physical properties of Inconel-600 (Specialmetals) 
Item Properties 
Density 8.47 Mg·m−3 
Melting Point 1354 to 1413 °C 
Specific Heat (heat capacity) 444 J·kg−1·K−1 
Electrical Resistivity 1.03 µΩ-m 
Curie Temperature −124 °C 
 
 
3.1.5. Management of the POOM Knowledgebase 
 
In the final stage of this step, the structure, all of its equipment and the connections, are 
stored in the POOM database. Initially, Microsoft Access is used as the database. The 
Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) is used to access the database from the main 
program. After the FSN is tested and found to be deployable, the data can be transferred 
to Oracle or any other robust Relational Database Management System (RDBMS). 
 
3.2. Fault Propagation Modelling with a Static FSN 
 
A Fault Semantic Network (FNS) is a set of terms-tokens linked by a set of predicate-
tokens for the purpose of fault diagnosis. An information database based semantic 




Figure 3.7: Fault propagation modelling with a static FSN 
The fault propagation scenarios are generated based on the historical data. Once the 
accuracy of the forecasting based on the historical data and the actual consequences 
reaches a certain level, the system can be used for real time forecasting fault propagation 
scenarios based on the real time data. The fault propagation model with static FSN is 
shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
3.2.1. Failure Mode Class of Plant Equipment 
 
Any equipment may have one or more failure modes. Some failure modes are the same 
for each equipment class, such as leaks in pipes and tanks. Those failure modes are 
assigned to the class failure modes to ensure unified failure mode definitions of plant 
equipment, which are stored in the FSN-POOM database.  
 
3.2.2. Modelling Class of Causes and Consequences 
 
The link between all the causes and consequences are established with the respective 
class of equipment. The probability of affecting a specific piece of equipment, given that 
another piece of equipment has a fault is calculated and stored in the database. For 
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example, the probability of equipment “B” developing a fault, given that equipment “A” 
has a probability of failing, is P(A) which is calculated by: 





       [3.1]
 
 
3.2.3. Plant Equipment Linkage to Failure Mode 
 
All pieces of equipment in the P&ID have their own equipment level failure mode and 
class level failure mode. Being in the unique setup of P&ID, each piece of equipment has 
its own unique set of failure modes. These sets of failure modes are stored in the 
database. 
 
3.2.4. Plant Level Fault Propagation Scenarios 
 
For each piece of equipment, there may be one or more probable process variable 
deviations, i.e. faults which may initiate fault propagation scenarios. At this stage, 
propagation of the faults of the individual piece of equipment is modeled in an algorithm. 
The algorithm that calculates the effect of fault propagation in an abnormal situation can 





3.2.5. Risk Estimation 
 
After the fault propagation scenario is modeled, the risk estimation is performed for the 
entire plant. For risk estimation, probabilistic methods, such as the BBN is used initially 
on the historical data to get the static FSN. Once the estimated risk is verified with the 
acceptable failure rate, the algorithm is used with real time data. 
 
3.2.6. Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
 
In view of the proposed process model using the plant POOM methodology, the FSN is 
utilized to construct a flexible fault knowledge structure in qualitative manner. For 
example, failures related to leaks might be associated with rules such as: 
IF (Structure_Material = (X or Y)) and (PV = Pressure) and (Dev <= 100/100 or 
Dev >= 80/100) 
THEN 
(FM = Crack) 
ENDIF 
 
These rules are initially defined in generic form, based on domain knowledge; i.e. 





Figure 3.8: An example of an FSN (Adapted from Gabbar, 2012) 
 
A risk element is identified for each hazard or fault propagation scenario from the root 
causes to the final consequences. In Figure 3.8, there are three possible risk elements 
associated with consequence-1: a) cause-1→failure-1→ consequence-1; b) cause-
2→failure-1→ consequence-1; c) cause-3→failure-1→consequence-1. 
Where 
 CaFr = Frequency of cause (1, 2 and 3) 
FPr = Probability of failure 
CoPr = Probability of that consequence to occur (1, 2 and 3) due to any cause 
Total magnitude of the consequence is considered to be Colm1, which is the total impact 
of consequence-1. For independent events, the total risk associated with consequence-1 is 
shown in equation [Eq-3.2]. 




Similarly, the total risk of consequence-2 and consequence-3 can be computed. In case 
the events are dependant, the Bayesian theorem should be used to determine the total risk 
based on dependencies for cause-1, cause-2 and cause-3, as shown in equation [3.3]. 




XPXAP         [3.3] 
(Gabbar, 2012) 
The BBN is discussed in further detail in Section 3.4.4. 
 
3.3. Mapping Independent Protection Layers to the FSN 
 
There are already some built-in protection layers to protect any process from failure. The 
parameters of the protection layers of the equipment are stored in the database and taken 
into consideration when calculating the risk factor. The steps of mapping the IPL to the 
FSN are shown in Figure 3.9. 
 
 





3.3.1. Equipment Failure Mode 
 
The failure modes of equipment are related to the process variables of the equipment. 
Deviation of process variables and interaction of deviated process variables may cause an 
unusual situation and consequently an accident. Different equipment has different failure 
modes. 
 
3.3.2. Independent Protection Layer (IPL) 
 
For every piece of equipment, there may be multiple failure modes. For each failure 
mode, there may already be some kind of protection layers, which are independent of 
each other. Hence, they are known as Independent Protection Layers (IPL). The IPL are 
the safeguards against process safety issues. The process industry is obligated to provide 
and maintain a safe working environment for the employees. Safety is provided through 
inherently safe design and various safeguards, such as Safety Instrumented Systems 
(SIS), procedures, and training. During a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study, a 
person or a team is responsible for assessing the process risk from various process 
deviations and determining the consequence of potential incidents. The person or team 
identifies the safeguards used to mitigate the hazardous events, which are not fully 





Figure 3.10: Independent Layers of Protection 
 
In this section, the Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is presented highlighting the 
key considerations. LOPA is a powerful analytical tool for assessing the adequacy of 
protection layers used to mitigate process risk. LOPA is built upon well-known process 
hazards analysis techniques, applying semi-quantitative measures to the evaluation of the 
frequency of potential incidents and the probability of failure of the protection layers 
(Summers, 2002). 
LOPA is a semi-quantitative methodology that can be used to identify safeguards that 
meet the IPL criteria established by the CCPS1 (Centre for Chemical Process Safety) in 
1993 (Summers, 2002). While IPLs are extrinsic safety systems, they can be active or 
passive, as long as the following criteria are met: 
• Specificity: The IPL is capable of detecting and preventing or mitigating the 
consequences of specified, potentially hazardous event(s), such as a runaway 
reaction, loss of containment, or an explosion. 
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• Independence: An IPL is independent of all the other protection layers associated 
with the identified potentially hazardous event. Independence requires that the 
performance is not affected by the failure of another protection layer or by the 
conditions that caused another protection layer to fail. Most importantly, the 
protection layer is independent of the initiating cause. 
• Dependability: The protection provided by the IPL reduces the identified risk by a 
known and specified amount. 
• Auditability: The IPL is designed to permit regular periodic validation of the 
protective function (Summers, 2002). 
 
3.3.3. Linking a Fault Propagation Scenario to an IPL 
 
 For each piece of equipment, there may be one or more probable process variable 
deviations; i.e. faults are linked with the respective fault propagation scenarios. IPLs are 
designed for safeguards against those process safety issues. For each Fault Propagation 
Scenario (FPS), a link to IPL has to be established accordingly in the POOM database. 
 
3.4. Calculation of Dynamic Probability and Updating 
the FSN 
 
So far, the work was on the static FSN. In this section, the dynamic FSN is introduced. 
The static FSN works with historical-real-life data, whereas the dynamic FSN works with 





Figure 3.11: Calculating dynamic probability and updating the FSN 
 
3.4.1. Priori Data 
 
The static FSN was first established based on the priori data. The FSN is verified using 
the priori data from historical events. To verify with the historical events, there may be 
four types of queries, which are as follows: 
1) Diagnostic 
2) Predictive 
3) Inter-causal and 
4) Combined query 
The queries are discussed in detail in section 3.4.3. 
 
3.4.2. Posteriori Data 
 
At this stage, real time data is used to establish the probabilistic FSN. As real life data is 
not available, a simulation tool is used in this paper. In the static FSN, the probabilistic 
approach is used to test the approach. In the historical data, the consequences are already 
known. The physics of fault propagation is known from the priori data which is now used 
to predict the consequences for posteriori data. 
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3.4.3. The Bayesian Belief Network 
 
The BBN is widely used for fault diagnosis, root cause and consequence analysis. Details 
about some previous research in BBN for fault diagnosis are discussed in Chapter 2. The 
process of constructing BBN for process fault diagnosis, root cause and consequence 
analysis is shown in Figure 3.12. Data collected from a liquefaction process, combined 
with maintenance history, maintenance expert opinion and evidence collected by field 
operators, is used for BBN construction. The K2 algorithm (Cooper, 1992) is used for 
learning the BBN structure and node probabilities. After the network has learned from the 
training data, a junction tree algorithm (Madsen, 1999) is used to query the network. The 
inference process updates the network probabilities according to the evidence entered.  
 





The BBN has the ability to dynamically change by incorporating new data and updating 
its internal structure, rules and interaction strengths. In order to get the expected results, it 
is necessary to query the BBN in a structured way by incorporating the observations in 
the BBN to update the structure according to the observed nodes and to obtain an answer 
to the query. Different types of queries are used in the BBN. The queries are explained as 
follows:  
• Diagnostic Query: This type of query can be called backtracking. Diagnostic 
query starts from symptoms and obtained results are the causes. Therefore, the 
direction of the query is opposite to the arc direction. In an example of 
compressor fault diagnosis, vibration test results can be considered as symptoms. 
The FSN can be queried to recognize the high pressure or cavitation as causes. 
• Predictive Query: This type of query is for prediction of the consequences based 
on causes. Predictive query predicts faults in advance even without assuming 
symptoms; for instance, increasing load on a compressor can cause a particular 
vibration index to increase.  
• Inter-causal Query: This type of query is used when multiple causes result in 
one symptom, for instance, both high pressure and vibration can result in one 
symptom, which may be increased temperature in the tank. 
• Combined Query: This type of query is used when one cause results in multiple 
symptoms; for example rust inside a pipe can cause both high pressure in the 
pump and low flow. 
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An example of a BBN for the manufacturing process is shown in Figure 3.13.  The node 
probabilities, as shown in the figure, are either assigned by an expert or learnt by 
historical data. The BBN is flexible and powerful enough to query in any direction. In the 
query process, we enter an evidence of an occurrence in the BBN, which returns the 
answer to the query and updates the probability tables. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: The BBN for fault diagnosis 
 
 
The diagnostic query can be as follows: 
What is the probability of the cause “Rust (a)” provided “Smell Gas (m)” has occurred? 
Evidence: Smell Gas (m) = True 
Query the BBN: 




The BBN returns that there is 18.91% chance of “Rust (a)”. 
The predictive query can be as follows: 
What is the probability of observing “Uneven Ratio (q)” provided “Vibration (e)” has 
occurred? 
Evidence: Vibration (e) = True 
Query the BBN: 
P (q | e)  =  91.51% False 
08.49% True 
The BBN returns that there is 8.49% chance of observing “Uneven Ratio (q)” above the 
threshold. 
The inter-causal query can be as follows: 
What is the probability of observing “Fatigue (g)” and “Corrosion (h)” combined, 
provided “Uneven Ratio (q)” has occurred? 
Evidence: Uneven Ratio (q) = True 
Query the BBN: 
P (g, h |q)  =  76.03% False 
23.97% True 
 
The BBN returns that there is 23.97% chance of observing both “Fatigue (g)” and 
“Corrosion (h)” together. 
The combined query can be as follows: 
What is the probability of observing “Smell gas (m)” and “Fire (n)” provided “Rust (a)” 
has occurred? 
Evidence: Rust (a) = True 
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Query the BBN: 
P (m, n | a)  =  89.01% False 
10.99% True 
The BBN returns that there is 10.99% chance of observing “Smell gas (m)” and “Fire 
(n)” above the threshold. 
 
3.4.4. Updating the Fault Semantic Network 
 
In a process, there may be many initial causes. Eight initial events are shown here for 
simplicity. These are as follows: 
1) High Temperature 
2) Low Temperature 
3) High Pressure 
4) Low Pressure 
5) High Flow 




There are several safety systems employed in a process system to prevent these initial 
events from happening. These may be special safety systems, or may be embedded in the 
form of passive safety or inherent safety systems. The vertical line after the initial events 
in Figure 3.14 represents the safety systems which have been installed to check the 
propagation of initial events. It is important to note that not every initial event leads to a 
fault. Some of the events eventually die out with time, while others have a potential to 






Figure 3.14: A typical fault propagation scenario in a typical process industry 
(Adapted from Chin, Wang, Poon and Yang, 2009) 
 
Once an initial event has taken place, it can either be suppressed by the corresponding 
safety system, or could break the barrier or the IPL, and could result in a secondary cause 




In Figure 3.14, high temperature, high pressure, high flow, overflow and impurities could 
cause vibration and fatigue. Furthermore, low temperature, low pressure and low flow 
cause only vibration and no fatigue. Vibrations and fatigue would cause corrosion 
because the initial events could not be prevented by the IPL.  In other words, the primary 
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safety systems had failed. It can be noted that these secondary causes have a potential to 
give birth to tertiary events if they are not stopped by the secondary IPL. 
If the secondary IPL also failed, a tertiary events may be caused, which is corrosion. 
Corrosion may be caused by vibrations or by continuous fatigue. It reduces the durability 
and performance of the tank, and hence is an undesirable event. If corrosion occurs, the 
probability of occurrence of a hazard rapidly increases, because if the third level IPL 
fails, it may lead to a leak or reduced mechanical strength. A leak can cause fire or 
intoxication, depending upon the contents of the tank, where as reduced mechanical 
strength of the tank may result in an explosion in the plant. Both of these situations are 
extremely undesirable. 
 
Summary: In this chapter, the methodology of developing the FSN in multiple steps has 
been presented. Even though P&ID modelling is not the subject of this research, it has 
been briefly discussed, because P&ID is an integral part of FSN modelling. Steps in 
designing the POOM database from P&ID are explained. Mapping IPL to FM is shown. 
The methodology of designing a static FSN is discussed. Finally, how to transform from a 
static FSN to a dynamic FSN is presented. 
In the next chapter, one case study on TE process is presented to verify the steps 
described in the methodologies.  
53 
 
Chapter 4: Case Study 
 
The proposed solution is applied to the TE process to verify the steps described in the 
methodologies. The plant process is modeled using POOM, which includes the 
definitions of real time safety verification, as well as failure / fault models.  This also 
includes systematic modelling of fault propagation scenarios, quantitatively and 
qualitatively, using the Fault Semantic Network (FSN) and mapping to process variables. 
Real time and simulation data are used to map safety protection layers; i.e. IPLs to fault 
propagation scenarios, with associated Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) and risks. 
Risks are estimated for each fault propagation scenario and for the whole system 
equipment / components, and associated with FSN. Safety verification algorithm is 
applied to the case studies based on target risk level and anticipated dynamic system risk 
for each fault propagation scenario. 
 
4.1. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) 
 
The Tennessee Eastman (TE) process is a representation of a real chemical process that 
was introduced by Downs and Vogel in early 1990 (Downs and Vogel, 1993). It is one of 
the important modelling tools proposed for researchers in 1990 by the Eastman chemical 
company. The process modeled by the Eastman chemical company is a defined chemical 
process allied with the TE process. A simplified schematic view of the TE process is 




Figure 4.1: A simplified version of the TE process 
(Adapted from Larsson et al., 2001) 
 
It later became a standard process to be used by industries and researchers in different 
experiments with different purposes, such as a comparison of control strategies, and fault 
detection. Since the TE process represents a real chemical process with real faults, it is 
being used as a valid simulated process and published in many authors’ results, based on 
the simulations (Larsson, Hestetun, Hovland, & Skogestad, 2001, McAvoy, 1994). A 
number of parameters, disturbances, complexities and control strategies implemented in 
the TE process made it more similar to a real process which could be reliably applied to 




4.2. Process Modelling and Simulation 
 
For the purpose of the case study a simulation model for the TE process is developed in 
MATLAB® Simulink®. In the Simulink® simulation file, parameters can be changed as 
per the requirements of the research. An interface was designed in LabVIEW® for 
inserting disturbances and visualizing the results. The front panel of the prototype was 
developed at the Energy Safety and Control Laboratory (ESCL), University of Ontario 
Institute of Technology (UOIT) (Hussain, 2013). The simulation data presented here are 
the output of the TE process with some parameters changed. 
The process simulated here consists of five major units of operation, including a vapour-
liquid separator, a compressor, two reactors, a condenser and a product stripping column. 
Eight components of the TE process are shown in Table 4.1 (Downs and Vogel, 1993). 
The nonlinearity characteristic of the process is mainly because of chemical reactions in 
the reactors. A schematic view of the complete TE process is shown in Figure 4.2. 
The process produces two products and two by-products from four reactions as follows: 
 Product 1: A(g) + C(g) + D(g) → G (liquid) 
 Product 2: A(g) + C(g) + E(g) → H (liquid) 
 By-product 1: A(g) + E(g)  → F (liquid) 
 By-product 2: 3D   → 2F (liquid) 
In the process, there are four feed streams (A, D, E, and C), one product stream, and one 
purge stream. Almost all of the inert B enters in the largest feed C which actually 
contains almost 50% of component A (Larsson et al., 2001). Table 4.1 shows the physical 
properties of the components. 
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A 2.0 - - 14.6 - 
B 25.4 - - 2.04 - 
C 28.0 - - 1.05  
D 32.0 299 7.66 1.85 202 
E 46.0 365 4.17 1.87 372 
F 48.0 328 4.45 2.02 372 
G 62.0 612 2.55 0.712 523 
H 76.0 617 2.45 0.628 486 
 
The reactants A, D and E directly enter the reactor while the reactant C first enters the 
product stripper and then, through a recycle steam process, reaches the reactor. Products 
of the reactor exit from the upper exit of the reactor and enter the condenser for the 
condensation process. The condenser converts vapour to liquid and then the condenser 
products pass through the vapour-liquid separator. The separator has to separate the 
vapour from the liquid where the liquid, which is heavier, exits from below and the 
vapour exits from the upper exit, as it is lighter. The liquefied product from the separator 
transfers to the product stripper to purify, and the vapour products transfer to the 




Figure 4.2: The TE Process (Adapted from Downs and Vogel, 1993) 
 
The TE process produces two main products, G and H. All reactions are irreversible and 
exothermic. There are six different operating modes defined for the TE process, 
according to the plant production rate and the ratio between the two main products, G and 








Table 4.2: Operating mode of the TE Process (Downs and Vogel, 1993) 
Modes G/H Ratio Production Rate 
1 50/50 7038 kg·hr−1 G − 7038 kg∙hr−1 H 
2 10/90 1408 kg·hr−1 G − 12699 kg∙hr−1 H 
3 90/10 10000 kg·hr−1 G − 1111 kg∙hr−1 H 
4 50/50 Maximum Production Rate 
5 10/90 Maximum Production Rate 
6 90/10 Maximum Production Rate 
 
 
There are 41 measured variables in the TE process, from XMEAS1 to XMEAS41. There 
are 12 manipulated variables, from XMV1 to XMV12. Measured variables are dependent 
variables; manipulated variables are considered as independent variables. The measured 
variables from XMEAS1 to XMEAS22 are continuous. In order to see how the 
manipulated variables affect the measured ones, they are changed either randomly or by 
steps under normal and disturbed operational conditions. The 22 measured variables, 








Table 4.3: Measured variables in the TE Process (Downs and Vogel, 1993) 
Variable Name Variable Number 
Base Case 
Value Units 
A feed (stream 1) XMEAS (1) 0.25052 kscmh 
D feed (stream 2) XMEAS (2) 3664.0 kg·h-1 
E feed (stream 3) XMEAS (3) 4509.3 kg·h-1 
A and C feed (stream 4) XMEAS (4) 9.3477 kscmh 
Recycle flow (stream 8) XMEAS (5) 26.902 kscmh 
Reactor feed rate (stream 6) XMEAS (6) 42.339 kscmh 
Reactor pressure XMEAS (7) 2705.0 kPa 
Reactor level XMEAS (8) 75.000 % 
Reactor temperature XMEAS (9) 120.40 oC 
Purge rate (stream 9) XMEAS (10) 0.33712 kscmh 
Product separator temperature XMEAS (11) 80.109 oC 
Product separator level XMEAS (12) 50.000 % 
Product separator pressure XMEAS (13) 2633.7 kPa 
Product separator underflow (stream 10) XMEAS (14) 25.160 m3·h-1 
Stripper level XMEAS (15) 50.000 % 
Stripper pressure XMEAS (16) 3102.2 kPa 
Stripper underflow (stream 11) XMEAS (17) 22.949 m3·h-1 
Stripper temperature XMEAS (18) 65.731 oC 
Stripper steam flow XMEAS (19) 230.31 kg·h-1 
Compressor work XMEAS (20) 341.43 Kw 
Reactor cooling water outlet temperature XMEAS (21) 94.599 oC 


















D Feed Flow (stream 2) XMV (1) 63.053 0 5811 kg·h-1 
E Feed Flow (stream 3) XMV (2) 53.980 0 8354 kg·h-1 
A Feed Flow (stream 1) XMV (3) 24.644 0 1.017 kscmh 
A and C Feed Flow (stream 4) XMV (4) 61.302 0 15.25 kscmh 
Compressor Recycle Valve XMV (5) 22.210 0 100 % 
Purge valve (stream 9) XMV (6) 40.064 0 100 % 
Separator Pot Liquid Flow (stream 10) XMV (7) 38.100 0 65.71 m3·h-1 
Stripper Liquid Product Flow (stream 11) XMV (8) 46.534 0 49.10 m3·h-1 
Stripper Steam Valve XMV (9) 47.446 0 100 % 
Reactor Cooling Water Flow XMV (10) 41.106 0 227.1 m3·h-1 
Condenser Cooling Water Flow XMV (11) 18.114 0 272.6 m3·h-1 
Agitator Speed XMV (12) 50.000 150 250 RPM 
 
 
The list of independent variables in Table 4.4 includes some variables that are listed as 
thousand standard cubic metres per hour (kscmh); kilograms per hour (kg·h−1); or as 
cubic metres per hour (m3·h−1). Some variables are listed as valve positions (percentage, 
%). For those independent variables listed as kscmh, kg·h−1, or m3·h−1, the flow-rate is not 
a function of upstream or downstream pressure. For those independent variables listed as 
valve positions (%), the flow-rate is a function of pressure. 
There are 20 disturbances in the TE process simulation with different probabilities of 
occurrences, from IDV1 to IDV20. The disturbances are chosen in a way to cover all the 
operational aspects of the TE process. A brief description of all the disturbances is 
mentioned in Table 4.5. 
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A/C feed ratio, B composition constant (stream 4) IDV (1) Step 
B composition, A/C ratio constant (stream 4) IDV (2) Step 
D feed temperature (stream 2) IDV (3) Step 
Reactor cooling water inlet temperature IDV (4) Step 
Condenser cooling water inlet temperature IDV (5) Step 
A feed loss (stream 1) IDV (6) Step 
C header pressure loss-reduced availability (stream 4) IDV (7) Step 
A, B, C feed composition (stream 4) IDV (8) Random variation 
D feed temperature (stream 2) IDV (9) Random variation 
C feed temperature (stream 4) IDV (10) Random variation 
Reactor cooling water inlet temperature IDV (11) Random variation 
Condenser cooling water inlet temperature IDV (12) Random variation 
Reaction kinetics IDV (13) Slow drift 
Reactor cooling water valve IDV (14) Sticking 
Condenser cooling water valve IDV (15) Sticking 
Unknown IDV (16) Unknown 
Unknown IDV (17) Unknown 
Unknown IDV (18) Unknown 
Unknown IDV (19) Unknown 
Unknown IDV (20) Unknown 
 
Description of the disturbances: 
 Disturbance-1: This is caused by an increase of component C in stream 4, the 
component A decreases and the component B is constant. Disturbance-1 causes an 
imbalance in the reactor feed and as a result, reactor pressure increases. 
 Disturbance-2: This is same as Disturbance-1 with the same A/C feed ratio. 
However, in Disturbance-2, there is an increase in component B in feed C. 
 Disturbance-3: The temperature of feed D increases, causing an increase in 
temperature and pressure of the reactor. 
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 Disturbance-4: As with Disturbance-3, this is a step change increase in the reactor 
cooling water temperature that in turn causes an increase in the reactor inlet 
temperature. 
 Disturbance-5: As with Disturbance-3, this is a step change increase in the 
condenser cooling water inlet temperature. 
 Disturbance-6: This is because of loss of feed A which causes an imbalance of 
chemical composition in the reactor feed. As a result, the plant shuts down. 
 Disturbance-7: This disturbance is because of loss of C head pressure. A decrease 
in reactor pressure is the effect. 
 Disturbance-8: This happens when there is a random variation on compositions in 
the reactor feed stream which causes imbalance in the components inside the 
reactor. 
 Disturbance-9: This disturbance is because of random variation of temperature in 
feed D. 
 Disturbance-10: As with Disturbance 9, this is because of random variation of 
temperature in feed C. 
 Disturbance-11: This is because of random variation of reactor cooling water inlet 
temperature that causes temperature variation in the reactor. 
 Disturbance-12: Rapid fluctuation in the condenser cooling water inlet 
temperature results in a decrease in condenser output temperature. 
 Disturbance-13:  This is due to imbalances in reactor kinetics. A slower than 
normal operation may affect the reaction products. 
 Disturbance-14: Stickiness in the reactor cooling water valve is the cause of 
Disturbance-14. Fluctuation in flow rate, pressure and temperature are the 
consequences of the sticky valve. 
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 Disturbance-15: Stickiness in the condenser cooling water valve is the cause of 
Disturbance-15. Fluctuation in flow rate, pressure and temperature are the 
consequences of sticky valves. 
 Disturbance-16: Even though there is no detailed explanation of Disturbace-16 to 
Disturbance-20 in Downs and Vogel (1993), other references, such as Sukumaran 
(2003) showed that it is because of a slow drift in temperature of the utility 
stream. 
 Disturbance-17: According to Sukumaran (2003), it is a sinusoidal variation of the 
utility stream’s temperature. As a result, it is expected to have sinusoidal variation 
in other process variables, such as reactor pressure and temperature. 
 Disturbance-18: This is probably due to extra noises during the process of 
sampling measurement values. 
 Disturbance-19: The probable existance of noise in the stripper is the cause of 
Disturbance-19. Fluctuation in production rate is expected as a consequence. 
 Disturbance-20: This is a blockage in the condenser tube which consequently 
causes fluctuation in the temperture of cooling water (Sukumaran, 2003). 
 
4.3. Fault Simulation of the TE Process 
 
In this section FSN, is implemented using LabVIEW® as the front-end graphical user 
interface. MATLAB® is used to implement the BBN, and the Simulink® for the TE 
process simulation.  The interface can be seen in Figure 4.3. In this simulation, two 
disturbances are created by clicking the “Step 1: Create Disturbances” tab.  After clicking 





Figure 4.3: The TE Process interface in LabVIEW® 
 
The disturbances selection is shown in Figure 4.4(a). Any combination of disturbances 
can be selected from Disturbance-1 to Disturbance-15. The disturbance affecting the 
variables can be seen in Figure 4.4(b). The two nodes on top of the spider web like 
structure are the two disturbances. The rest of the nodes are the affected variables. The 
probabilities of the disturbances entered were as follows: 
Reactor cooling water inlet temperature: IDV4 = 0.06 














b) Relationship between the variable with 
disturbances and the affected variables 
 
Figure 4.4: Insertion of disturbances and the relationships between 
disturbances and the affected variables 
 
After the disturbances are created, the LabVIEW® program automatically calls the TE 
process simulation engine to simulate the process for a few seconds (representing 72 
hours in the simulation), incorporating the disturbances. The TE process simulation 
engine simulates the process and displays the results. The MATLAB® engine is called by 
clicking the “Step 2: Train Bnet/HMM” tab to train the BBN on the simulated data. The 
BBN training engine uses the K2 algorithm, as described by Coopers (1992), and learns 
the structure of the BBN along with the corresponding probabilities. The results are 
displayed as a graph with participating nodes and the arcs connecting the nodes. In this 
particular case, the nodes are IDV4 and  IDV6, and from XMEAS1 to XMEAS22. After 
the BBN is fully trained, the query engine of the FSN follows.  The query engine uses the 
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junction tree algorithm to make structured queries. The query interface is shown in Figure 
4.5. The probability of IDV6 present, when the impact on XMEAS10 was observed, is 
0.1253, as shown in the figure. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: The result of a diagnostic query 
 
The effect of the disturbance IDV6 is shown in Figure 4.6. The IDV6 is a step change in 
the A feed loss. The effect of this disturbance is propagated in the measured variables 




Figure 4.6: Measured variable-1 A feed flow 
 
The effect of A feed loss (XMEAS1) on the reactor pressure (XMEAS7) is shown in 
Figure 4.7. As listed in Table 4.3, the nominal flow value of XMEAS1 is 0.25052 
thousand standard cubic meters per hour (kscmh) but the loss occurs at time steps of 3rd, 
34th, 65th and 70th hours for one hour as seen in Figure 4.7. After the feed is restored at 
the time step of the following hours, the control system peaks the A feed flow at 1 kscmh 
to compensate the loss, and slowly decreases the flow to reach the nominal value of 
0.25052 kscmh. Because of this abrupt peak in the A feed flow to the reactor, the reactor 
pressure also exhibits a peak and abruptly changes from 2785 kPa to 2828 kPa, as shown 
in Figure 4.7. 



















Figure 4.7: Measured variable-7 Reactor Pressure 
 
The IDV4 is a step increase in the reactor cooling water inlet flow that eventually 
disturbs the reactor temperature. When the cooling water flow is increased through the 
reactor, there is not enough time for the cooling to take place and, as a result, the reactor 
temperature increases. The disturbance IDV4 as a step increase in the cooling water flow 
rate is shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
 























Figure 4.8: Reactor coolant flow 
 
Table 4.6: Probability of dependency 
P (XMEAS | IDV4, IDV6) IDV4 (%) IDV6 (%) 
XMEAS7 0.047 98.80 
XMEAS8 0.74 91.90 
XMEAS9 99.50 82.60 
XMEAS20 17.70 96.19 
XMEAS21 99.90 71.75 
 
 
Some probabilities of dependency among IDV4 (step increase in the reactor cooling 
water inlet flow), IDV6 (“A” feed loss), and XMEAS7 (reactor pressure), XMEAS8 
(reactor level), XMEAS9 (reactor temperature), XMEAS20 (compressor work), and 



















XMEAS21 (reactor cooling water outlet temperature) are listed in Table 4.6, while it can 
be seen that IDV6 (A feed loss) affects the XMEAS7 (reactor pressure) by 98.8% as 
shown in Figure 4.6, while IDV4 (step increase in the reactor cooling water inlet flow) 
does not have any effect on XMEAS7 (reactor pressure). 
Similarly, IDV6 (“A” feed loss) affects the XMEAS8 (reactor level) by 91.9% while 
IDV4 (step increase in the reactor cooling water inlet flow) does not have any effect on 
XMEAS8 (reactor level). IDV4 (step increase in the reactor cooling water inlet flow) has 
a strong effect (99.5%) on XMEAS9 (reactor temperature). IDV6 (A feed loss) affects 
the XMEAS9 (reactor temperature) by 82.6% as loss in A feed can result in temperature 
change in the reactor. In the case of IDV6 (A feed loss), no or less liquid is delivered to 
the compressor and as a result the compressor works more, XMEAS20 (compressor 
work). 
A transient change in the reactor temperature is shown in Figure 4.9. There is also a small 





Figure 4.9: Reactor temperature 
 
4.4. Real Time FSN Simulation 
 
An implementation of the FSN to monitor the data emanating from the TE process in real 
time is shown in Figure 4.10. At any given time, the FSN detects the disturbance, plots 
the dependency lines, and calculates the relative probabilities by querying the BBN. The 
probabilities of top events are also calculated with associated risks and safety barriers are 
introduced as Risk Reduction Factors (RRF). Neither A feed loss nor the Level Control 
Valve (LCV) respond when given a command to open, as shown in Figure 4.10. In both 
cases, the liquid delivered to the reactor decreases and the top events can be “No Level” 
or “Low Level”. If there are safety barriers in place with RRF to detect and mitigate the 




















Disturbance Due to IDV6: "A" Feed Loss
Transient Due to IDV4
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causes, the FSN calculates the probabilities of the top events (TE) and the probabilities of 
the final risks. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Relationships between causes and consequences in 
the LabView simulation 
 
The parameters of the MATLAB® Simulink® simulation file are shown in Figure 4.11. 
The parameters have to be updated to fit individual research needs. The output product 
ratio, i.e. G/H, is shown in Table 4.2. In the Simulink® file, the G/H can be set to any 
ratio. Random numbers can be fed-in for all 20 disturbances. However, our team decided 




Figure 4.11: The parameters in the MATLAB® Simulink® simulation model 
 
 
The variables that can be updated in the MATLAB®  Simulink® file are: 
1) Production setpoint 
2) Strip Level setpoint 
3) Step level setpoint 
4) Reactor level setpoint 
5) Reactor pressure setpoint 
6) Mole percentage (%) of G setpoint 
7) Percentage (%) of  C setpoint 
8) Recycle rate setpoint 
9) Reactor temperature setpoint 
10) Recycle valve position 
11) Steam valve position 





Summary: In this chapter, the TE process, which is a well defined simulation, is 
presented as a case study. A MATLAB® Simulink® file was created for the simulation 
purpose. LabVIEW® was used to interact with the MATLAB® Simulink® file. An analysis 
has been performed on simulation data to construct the static FSN. Using real time data, 
the dynamic FSN was updated and simulated. 
In the next chapter, system design and implementation of the FSN are discussed. The 




Chapter 5: System Design & Implementation 
 
A Semantic network (SN) is a network structure that represents relations between 
concepts. The earliest attempt was made by Collins and Quillian (1969) when they 
introduced a semantic network in a tree structure (directed or undirected graph) that 
consists of nodes and arcs where the nodes represent concepts and connections showed 
relations between nodes. A tree-structured of the SN is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Tree structure of a Semantic Network 
An SN models systems in order to represent different concepts such as, statistical, 
taxonomic and industrial, and specifies relations between them. Specifying relations 
between concepts is possible by implementing a special set of procedures that performs 
reasoning between them.  
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An SN could attain success and gain more attention in different industries because of its 
wide applications such as fault recognition and root cause analysis. A Fault Semantic 
Network (FSN) can identify the causes and consequences, as well as any events in-
between, and is also applicable to a variety of industrial processes. Thus, it is an example 
of a promising application of an SN. 
The structure of the proposed FSN follows the design explained by Gabbar (2012). The 
proposed FSN is developed in two layers: static (offline) and dynamic (online). A static 
FSN includes failure, fault, hazard and accidents as structured and linked in the form of 
causation models, which are associated with process equipment, as individual and 
between adjacent process equipment. A dynamic FSN is constructed using dynamic real 
time or simulated process data from operation, maintenance, safety and control (Gabbar, 
2012). 
The structure of an SN is somewhat similar to a tree in that they have common 
terminologies. The root node is the node which does not have any parent and the node 
that has no child is called the leaf. Any other node in between is called an intermediate 
node. Hence, in a semantic network the root node represents the root cause and the leaf 
represents the consequence. Pressure and vapor inside of a process vessel can be 






5.1. Proposed System Architecture 
 
There may be a deviation in one level which may propagate to the next level; i.e. class 
level, equipment level, plant level. A reverse model, i.e. how plant level deviations affect 
class level or class level deviations affect equipment level, is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Class level and equipment level deviations 
 
Equipment level deviation affects class level and plant level, while class level deviation 
affects plant level and equipment level and plant level deviation affects equipment level 
and class level 
The system architecture is carefully selected to capture qualitative / quantitative fault, 
failure, hazard, and accident data as shown in Figure 5.3. Real time data is captured from 
a Digital Computer System (DCS) and analyzed using code written in MATLAB®-
Simulink®. Cape-Mode is developed within Microsoft Visio to capture and structure 
process design models for Process Block Diagrams (PBD), Process Flow Diagram (PFD), 
and Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID), based on ISA-S95 / 88. A Fault 
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Diagnostic System (FDS) is developed to construct fault models using qualitative-
quantitative and deterministic-probabilistic techniques. A Fault simulator engine is 
developed within MATLAB®-Simulink®, where fault propagation, equipment reliability, 
and material degradation are calculated and used to construct and maintain fault / failure 
propagation models. A Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) tool is used to evaluate the 
granular level of process and equipment condition data such as temperature and pressure 
profile within a process vessel, or corrosion profile in pipeline a body (Gabbar, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Proposed system architecture for failure, fault, 
hazard and accident data acquisition 
 
The data related to faults, failures, hazards and accidents are stored in databases. Any 
database management program such as Oracle or Microsoft SQL Server can be used for 
this purpose. Common data which relates to all plants are stored in a common database. 
The data for specific plants are stored in a database specific to that plant. The structure is 
shown in Figure 5.4(a). Use of an appropriate level of detail in the computer program 
primarily depends on the nature of the desired outputs and the applications under study. 
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Based on the requirements and availability of the program, Microsoft Visio has been 
selected to be the main program as it has the capability of drawing diagrams as well as 
interacting with databases through ODBC. The basic descriptive constructs provided by 
the program for developing the thermal models will be created within the constraints of 
the program. Given the correct input parameters that cover different aspects of the plant, 
parent-class, daughter-class and equipment-class, and other related parameters 
surrounding the plant, Visio along with its supporting programs, is able to internally 
convert them to a mathematical form suitable for numerical solutions.  Initially, 
Microsoft Access is used as database management system. Later on data will be ported to 
Oracle. Other software such as MATLAB® and C++ are being used as and when required 











b) MATLAB® is used for intensive 
calculations and graphical simulations 
 
Figure 5.4: Relationships between different databases, between databases 
and programs and between different programs 
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In the final step of this stage, the program reads the P&ID from the canvas and uses the 
information from the database, analyzes them according to the algorithm developed in the 
static FSN development stage. The FSN is then updated at the dynamic stage, and 
presents the output in an understandable manner. The output can be the result of a 
predictive, diagnostic, inter-causal or a combined query. 
 
5.2. The TE Process / Fault / Hazard / Accident Data 
Acquisition 
 
For data acquisition purposes, in a processing plant the equipment is assigned to different 
predefined groups. These groups are equipment classes. The classes are defined based on 
the function of the equipment belonging to that class. Some classes can be regrouped in 
parent classes. Classes are related to specific functions, components and process 
variables, as shown in Figure 5.5.  Each piece of equipment is assigned an equipment 






Figure 5.5: Proposed data acquisition model 
(Adapted from Gabbar, 2012) 
 
For implementation of the FSN, a database was selected. Initially Microsft Access was 
used. In future, the database will grow. As Access is not capable of handling large scale 
data, in a later stage large scale database such as Oracle can be used. To access the 
database from Visio, Open Data-Base Connectivity (ODBC) is used. Therefore, without 
changing the program, the database in the background can easily be changed.  
The tables are created in the database. Moreover, relationships between the tables are 
established. For example in the equipment table there are attributes such as Eq_ID, 
Eq_Name, and Eq_Desc. In the equipment-failure-mode table, there are attributes such as 
Eq_ID, FM_ID, and Eq_FM_Desc. Between the equipment-failure-mode table and the 
equipment table there is a relationship defined by Eq_ID. Similarly, in the failure-mode 
table there are attributes such as FM_ID, FM_Desc, and FM_Loc. Between the 
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equipment-failure-mode table and the failure-mode table, there is a relationship defined 
by FM_ID. An example is shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: An example of relationships between tables 
 
For front end programming, Microsoft Visio is used for convenience. In Visio, equipment 
can be dragged and dropped from the equipment database. The equipment can be 
connected using connector tools.  
The concept was used in two different fields: one is P&ID of the process industry and the 
other is the energy industry, i.e. the Energy Semantic Network (ESN). 
 
5.3. Implementation of the FSN 
 
Using user interface, different parameters of the equipment can be changed or updated as 
and when necessary. Material of construction is linked with the equipment and pipes. All 
the causes and consequences are linked with the equipment and pipes. The equipment 




Figure 5.7: User interface can be used to change parameters 
 
The link between the equipment can be changed, or parameters of the nodes can be 
updated from the user interface as and when necessary. The consequences, generated by 
the background program and listed on the user interface, are shown in Figure 5.8. The 





Figure 5.8: User interface can be used to generate consequences 
 
Summary: In this chapter, the implementation process of the system design of the FSN is 
presented. The software and database selection procedure, and the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the software, are explained. Designing of the FSN in node 
and tree concepts are presented. There are root nodes and leaf nodes. Roots are the 
causes and leaves are the consequences. The creation of the database, tables in the 
database and attributes of the tables are discussed. The front-end, i.e. the user interface 
to manipulate the variables and to observe the effects on KPI, is presented. 





Chapter 6: Evaluation and Results 
 
In the case study chapter, propagation scenarios of faults were simulated. The 
relationships between deviations and hazards and, ultimately, accidents were mostly 
established based on historical data. Many of the relationships were established based on 
scientific facts and engineering calculations.  
Initially, the FSN was constructed based on the ontology structure of fault models on the 
basis of POOM, where failure mode was described using symptoms, enablers, process 
variables, causes, and consequences. Implementing the FSN for a process with many 
process variables is not easy, especially in the real world. There are steps that should be 
undertaken by engineers and researchers to let them create a dynamic modelling of a 
process as a Semantic Network (SN) that contains all the possible faults and relationships 
between variables. In the FSN, the strength of the relationship between variables can be 
assigned both qualitatively and quantitatively through different reasoning approaches 
such as the probabilistic approach and mathematical formulation.  
In a process, there may be many variables that affect the operation. In order to implement 
complete analysis of the process, it is necessary to consider all variables. In the FSN, the 
number of process variables affects the accuracy of analysis. The analysis can be 
conducted by using just a manipulated and a measured variable. However, it will be 




6.1. The Static FSN of the TE Process 
 
The FSN was introduced in the TE process as a valuable tool with considerable abilities. 
Nodes correspond to different process variables/faults/causes/consequences and directed 
arcs are links between them that describe the dependencies and any node associated with 
its risk value. Therefore, it is possible to calculate risks of occurring failures or accidents. 
Links between causes, events, and consequences were implemented in the TE process 
simulation using the BBN algorithm, three examples of which are shown in Figures 6.1, 
6.2 and 6.3. 
In Figure 6.1, the event, “Insufficient Pressure”, was inserted. The probable causes 
identified by the BBN are: 
a) Instrumentation error 
b) Broken impeller 
c) Bent pipes 
d) Incorrect impeller 
e) Incorrect impeller diameter 
f) Cavitation 
g) Rotating backwards 
h) Rotational speed too low 
i) Insufficient Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) available 
 
The probable consequences identified by the BBN are: 
a) Seal leakage 
b) Fire 
c) Toxic release 




Figure 6.1: Causes and consequences of the event Insufficient Pressure 
 
In Figure 6.2, the event, “No Liquid Delivered”, was inserted. The probable causes 
identified by the BBN are: 
a) Pump not primed 
b) Liquid returned backward 
c) Suction valve shut 
d) Suction piping blocked 
e) Discharge piping blocked 
f) Insufficient NPSH available 
g) Motor failure 
h) Impeller jammed by foreign boddy 
i) Impeller seized 
j) Supply tank / vessel empty 
k) No liquid supply in pipe 
l) Motor wrongly wired 
m) Specific gravity higher than specified 
n) Viscosity higher than specified 
o) Volute shattered 
p) Broken drive coupling 
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q) Broken drive shaft 
r) Bearing in housing seized 
 
The probable consequences identified by the BBN are: 
s) Production lost 
t) Property Damage 
u) Excessive maintenance 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Causes and consequences of the event No Liquid Delivered 
 
In Figure 6.3, the event, “Pump Leakage”, was inserted. The probable causes identified 
by the BBN are: 
a) Mechanical seal passes 
b) Stuffing box packing excessively worn (for packed gland) 
c) Stuffing box bore damaged 
d) Pump shaft surface damaged 
e) Packing incorrectly installed 
f) Flange leaks (flange not sealing) 
g) Incorrectly assembled 
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h) Volute cracked 
i) Volute corroded 
j) Volute eroded 
 
The probable consequences identified by the BBN are: 
a) Seal leakage 
b) Fire 
c) Production loss 
d) Human injury 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Causes and consequences of the event Pump Leakage 
 
In the TE process the events are manually inserted; the causes and consequences related 
to the events are dynamically determined by the BBN. The algorithm of the BBN was 
established using historical-real-life data, in the learning stage. In the dynamic FSN, the 
BBN algorithm is updated by the system without any human intervention after certain 
intervals from the real-life data which makes the system faster than the other proposed 
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systems. As there is minimal human intervention, the probability of human error is also 
less. 
 
6.2. The Mapping of the IPL to the FSN 
 
The mapping of the IPL was performed in six steps, as described in Summers (2002): 
1) All reference documentation, including hazard analysis documentation, pressure relief 
valve design and inspection reports, and protection layer design documents are recorded. 
2) The process deviations and hazard scenario under consideration are documented. 
Specifically, high pressure anywhere in the system is focused on, as high pressure may 
result in equipment rupture. 
3) All of the initiating causes for the process deviation are identified and the frequency of 
each initiating cause was determined. All initiating causes of the hazard scenario, such as 
loss of flow control, loss of pressure control, and loss of temperature control were listed. 
4) The consequences of the hazard scenarios are determined. The evaluation included an 
examination of safety and environmental and economic losses. 
5) The IPLs that can completely mitigate all listed initiating causes are listed. It may be 
noted that the IPL must be completely independent from the initiating cause; e.g., if a 
process control loop is the initiating cause, an alarm generated by the process control 
transmitter cannot be used for risk reduction. 
6) Specific implementable recommendations are recorded. They are listed in such a way 




An example of the mapping of IPL in the TE process is shown in Figure 6.4. For the 
cause “LCV Stuck Open”, Safety Barriers I and II are not defined. For the cause “No 











6.3. The Dynamic FSN and Safety Verification of the 
TE Process 
 
An example of safety verification, along with the safety verification in the TE process is 
presented in this section. A fault propagation scenario of a particular initial event, for 
example high temperature is show in Figure 6.5. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Fault propagation scenario of high temperature 
 
The first step of safety verification is control limits estimation. For this purpose, the data 
in Table 6.1 is used. The Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) technique 
is used for estimating the control limits of the tank (Pillay and Wang, 2003, p. 149-177). 







Table 6.1: Historical tank temperature data (Wiersma, 1999) 
Day Specific Gravity Level (inches) Temp (Celsius) 
1 1.51 80 30 
2 1.53 38 35 
3 1.27 293 33 
4 1.31 325 29 
5 1.43 75 37 
6 1.48 229 27 
7 1.44 53 48 
8 1.38 262 35 
9 1.4 310 30 
10 1.45 70 30 
11 1.46 52 27 
12 1.22 271 23 
13 1.2 241 32 
14 1.26 72 19 
15 1.1 33 17 
16 1.05 259 19 
17 1.02 191 21 
18 1.06 78 20 
19 1.36 78 34 
20 1.32 41 39 
21 1.45 46 34 
22 1.4 104 57 
23 1.18 55 31 
24 1.41 85 45 
25 1.45 253 51 
 
The UCL and LCL to be calculated are defined with the help of the following 
expressions: 
 Upper control limit: UCL = EWMA0 + k·s2ewma   [6.1] 









    





 σ = standard deviation of the data 
 s2ewma = estimated variance 
 λ = a constant, such that 0.2 ≤ λ ≤ 0.3 
 EWMA0 = mean of historical data 
 k = a factor 
 values: 
  σ = 10.19 
  EWMA0 = 32.12 
  λ = 0.21 








UCL = 32.12 + 0.85×12.18 = 42.47 
  LCL = 32.12 − 0.85×12.18 = 21.77 
  
The values of the dataset, the UCL and the LCL are plotted on a EWMA graph in Figure 
6.6. The data points that lie outside the specified zone of operation can be seen in the 
figure. Whenever the temperature crosses either the UCL or the LCL, there is a 
possibility of an initial event taking place. A few out-of-zone points do not cause 
problems, but when they successively remain out, as depicted by the last five data points 
as seen in the figure, it is an indication of a potential problem which, if not addressed, 




Figure 6.6: An EWMA plot for the data set with the UCL and the LCL 
 
6.3.1. Hazard Identification 
 
Once the process exceeds the control limits, any possible hazard should be evaluated. 
Hazard identification means checking for all the hazardous conditions and events 
associated with the machine. Hazard identification includes predicting the hazards that 
may occur in a process. These hazards can be mechanical, electrical, thermal, chemical or 
environmental in nature. Failure mode and effect analysis is a comprehensive technique 
which is commonly used in fault scenarios, resulting in multiple failure modes. It is a 
method that examines potential failures in products or processes, and has been used in 
many quality management systems (Chin, Wang, Poon and Yang, 2009). This risk 




























analysis tool assumes that a failure mode occurs in a system or component through some 
failure mechanism. The effect of this failure is then evaluated. A risk ranking is produced 
in order to prioritise attention for each of the failure modes identified (Pillay and Wang, 
2003, p. 149-177).  
The risk analysis tool has become increasingly important in new product development, 
manufacturing or engineering applications. Risk assessment in Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) is generally carried out by using Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs), which 
can be determined by evaluating three factors: occurrence (OCC), severity (SEV) and 
detection (DET) (Zhang and Chu, 2011). 
The major hazards identified are leak, fire and explosion, which can cause widespread 
injuries and consequences to the workers and surrounding environment. 
Based upon the values of the three parameters used in FMEA, risk priority numbers are 
determined. The values of occurrence (OCC), severity (SEV) and detection (DET) are 
determined on a scale of 10 based upon the category in which a particular process lies. 
These categories are shown in Table 6.2. The higher the value of RPN, the higher the 
likelihood of hazard occurrence. In Figure 6.6, most of the data points lie between the 
UCL and LCL. Few of the data points are either over the UCL or under the LCL. This 










Table 6.2: Determination of Severity, Occurrence and Detection (Zhang and Chu, 2011) 
Scale Severity Occurrence Detection 
1 Will not notice 1 in 1000000 100% 
2 Probable slight annoyance 1 in 20000 99% 
3 Slight annoyance 1 in 5000 95% 
4 Dissatisfaction 1 in 2000 90% 
5 Uncomfortable 1 in 500 85% 
6 Slight compliant 1 in 100 80% 
7 High dissatisfaction 1 in 50 70% 
8 Very high dissatisfaction 1 in 20 60% 
9 Endangered with warning 1 in 10 50% 
10 Endangered without warning 1 in 2 Less than 
  
 
6.3.2. Risk Estimation and Evaluation 
 
Risk estimation is an essential part of risk analysis in a process, because the 
categorisation and allocation of safety requirements is based on this (Hietikko, Malm and 
Alanen, 2011). Once the hazards are identified, the next step is the quantification of risk. 
This risk evaluation is carried out using the Proportional Risk Assessment Technique 
(PRAT), which covers risk estimation and evaluation, and forms the third and key step in 
the safety verification framework. 
For better understanding, an example is presented in this section using the data in Table 
6.1 from Blanchard (1999). This data is failure rate data for various equipment and parts 
of the process. 
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Table 6.3: Failure Rate (Blanchard, 1999) 
Symbol Meaning Magnitude 
R1 Risk associated with high Temperature 9.00 
R2 Risk associated with Vibrations 2.50 
R3 Risk associated with Blockage 1.20 
R4 Risk associated with Corrosion 0.85 
R5 Risk associated with Leak 0.055 
R6 Risk associated with Reduced Mechanical Strength 0.085 
PFD1 Probability of Failure on Demand of IPL-1 0.003 
PFD2 Probability of Failure on Demand of IPL-2 0.0025 
PFD3 Probability of Failure on Demand of IPL-3 0.0035 
 
The risk can be quantified as: 
  Risk: R = (Probability of failure) × (Magnitude of its consequence) 
The magnitude of failure is calculated based on the historical data of accidents and the 
occurring consequences per event. This can be considered as a constant in the static FSN, 
while in the dynamic FSN it is continually recalculated based on real time data. The risk 
associated with any event is a function of failure rate and directly proportional to it.  
Risk Associated = f (failure rate) 
The fault propagation scenario shown in Figure 6.5 can be broken into four individual 
fault propagation scenarios for simplicity of calculation. Once broken down into 
individual fault propagation scenarios, they are evaluated and then combined to calculate 
the overall risk of the entire process. The individual fault propagation scenarios are 
shown in the following sections. The following formula is used to calculate the risk: 
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Risk associated (Path - i) = (Risk associated, event-1) 
    × (Probability of failure on demand of safety measure-1) 
    × (Risk associated, event-2) 
× (Probability of failure on demand of safety measure-2) 
. 
. 
× (Risk associated, event-n) 
    × (Probability of failure on demand of safety measure – n) 
    × (Risk associated with Final event) 
or 
Risk associated (Path - i) = (R1) × (PFD1) × (R2) × PFD2) × ...... × (Rn) × (PFDn) × (Rf) 
[6.4] 
• Risk for Fault Propagation Path-1 
The first fault propagation scenario is shown in Figure 6.7. The risk associated with fault 
propagation path-1 is calculated as follows: 
Risk associated (Path - 1) = (R1) × (PFD1) × (R2) × (PFD2) × (R4) × (PFD3) × (R5) 
 = 9 × 0.003 × 2.5 × 0.0025 × 0.85 × 0.0035 × 0.055 
Or Risk associated (Path - 1) = 2.76 × 10−8  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Risk associated with Path-1 
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• Risk for Fault Propagation Path-2 
The second fault propagation scenario is shown in Figure 6.8. The risk associated with 
fault propagation path-2 is calculated as follows: 
Risk associated (Path - 2) = (R1) × (PFD1) × (R2) × (PFD2) × (R4) × (PFD3) × (R6) 
 = 9 × 0.003 × 2.5 × 0.0025 × 0.85 × 0.0035 × 0.085 




Figure 6.8: Fault Propagation Scenario, Path-2 
 
• Risk for Fault Propagation Path-3 
The third fault propagation scenario is shown in Figure 6.9. The risk associated with fault 
propagation path-3 is calculated as follows: 
Risk associated (Path - 3) = (R1) × (PFD1) × (R3) × (PFD2) × (R4) × (PFD3) × (R5) 
 = 9 × 0.003 × 1.2 × 0.0025 × 0.85 × 0.0035 × 0.055 






Figure 6.9: Risk associated with Path-3 
 
• Risk for Fault Propagation Path-4 
The fourth fault propagation scenario is shown in Figure 6.10. The risk associated with 
fault propagation path-4 is calculated as follows: 
Risk associated (Path - 4) = (R1) × (PFD1) × (R3) × (PFD2) × (R4) × (PFD3) × (R6) 
 = 9 × 0.003 × 1.2 × 0.0025 × 0.85 × 0.0035 × 0.085 
Or Risk associated (Path - 4) = 2.05 × 10−8  
 
 






• Total Risk Associated 
The total risk associated with the process that an onset of a fault will lead to a hazard, i.e. 
fire or explosion, is the sum of the total risk associated with all the pathways. The 
calculation is as follows: 
Total Risk Associated (TRA) = (Risk associated (Path-1)) 
     + (Risk associated (Path-2)) 
     + (Risk associated (Path-3)) 
     + (Risk associated (Path-4)) 
   = 2.76 × 10−8 + 4.27 × 10−8 + 1.33 × 10−8 + 2.05 × 10−8  
Or Total Risk Associated (TRA) = 1.04 × 10−7   
 
 
6.3.3. Safety Verification 
 
If the total risk associated is less than the threshold risk, i.e. the maximum level of 
acceptable risk, the process is considered to be safe. Otherwise, it is not safe. This value 
of the threshold risk is calculated from the process historical data and other equipment 
data. It is calculated on the basis of the following formula:  
Threshold Risk (TR) = (Frequency of failure) × (Magnitude of failure) 
Considering the risk as a function of failure rate, the threshold risk is calculated. The 
typical value of failure rate can be taken as 5.00 × 10−6 per year (Blanchard, 1999). Thus, 
if the TRA is more than this value, the process is unsafe. 
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This value is the risk level of a single event scenario. In this case, high temperature 
comprises all the possible fault propagation scenarios which the event could take to be 
converted into a hazard. The safety verification is shown in Figure 6.11 and the 
calculation is shown as follows: 
The values: 
 Threshold Risk (TR)  = 5.00 × 10−6 
 Total Risk Associated (TRA) = 1.04 × 10−7   
 
Verification:  
                 1.04 × 10−7 < 5.00 × 10−6 
     TRA < TR 
Conclusion: 
              The process is safe 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Safety Verification Results 
 
For one or more causes in the TE process simulation, safety verification is performed 
automatically and the final risk is shown. Two random causes, upstream leakage and 
upstream pipe blockage, are applied by LabVIEW® as shown in Figure 6.12. The final 
risk, i.e. TRA, for the causes, calculated by the BBN, is 1.0 × 10–11. It is significantly 





Figure 6.12: Safety verification for upstream pipe blockage 
 
After the risk is calculated and compared with the predefined threshold risk, the links are 
established in the POOM database based on the accumulated information. The database is 
continually updated in every predefined interval with all of the updated information. 
 
6.3.4. Risk Reduction 
 
In the example and the simulation result above, the processes are safe. There is no 
immediate need of any risk reduction procedure. If the TRA were greater than the TR, 
immediate risk reduction would have become necessary. However, some methods which 
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will help in reduction of risk are listed below and the steps are shown in Figure 6.13. The 
following actions are taken to reduce the risk associated with any process: 
 Eliminate or reduce exposure to the hazard as far as practical. 
 Reduce the probability and severity. 
 Use safeguards and safety devices. 
 Determine that the performance and functional characteristics of the safety 








Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 
In any processing facility failure and accident as a consequence of fault or process 
variable deviation are a major concern. It is a challenge to keep the risks in processing 
plants at an acceptable level.  
In the case study chapter, propagation of faults were simulated as well as tested in a real 
life situation. The relationship between deviations and hazards, and ultimately accidents, 
are mostly established based on historical data. Many of the relationships were 
established based on scientific facts and engineering calculations. This effort is to lay a 
foundation for accident prediction and prevention in processing facilities. 
In this project, the design of an automated fault semantic network has been investigated. 
The investigation was carried out by examining various process deviations and 
examining the propagation of faults to accident scenarios. In the investigation, process 
variable interaction analysis is used to develop a simulation-based fault propagation 
analysis. The investigation has adopted two approaches that consist of a simulation of a 
chemical process, along with identifying relationships among process variables, 
quantitatively and qualitatively, for the purpose of finding causes and consequences, and 
tracing faults associated with them. 
In this research, real life data was used from an experimental setup of the FDS. LabView 
and MATLAB® Simulink were used to simulate the selected chemical process plant for 
107 
 
the purpose of extracting process data. Microsoft Visio and Visual Basic are used to 
implement the FSN. 
The FSN is introduced as a great tool with considerable abilities. In the FSN, nodes 
correspond to different faults/causes/consequences, and directed arcs are links between 
the nodes which describe the dependencies. 
Initially, the FSN is constructed based on the ontology structure of fault models on the 
basis of POOM where failure mode is described using symptoms, enablers, process 
variables, causes, and consequences. Implementing the FSN for a process with many 
process variables is not an easy job, especially when someone is asked to do it in the real 
world. There are steps that should be undertaken by engineers and researchers to let them 
create a dynamic modelling of a process as a semantic network that contains all the 
possible faults and possible relationships between variables. In the FSN, the strength of 
the relationship between variables can be assigned both qualitatively and quantitatively 
through different reasoning approaches such as a probabilistic approach and 
mathematical formulation.  
In a process, there may be many variables that affect the operation. In order to implement 
a complete analysis of the process, it is necessary to consider all variables. In the FSN, 
the number of process variables affects the accuracy of analysis. The analysis can be 
performed by just using a manipulated and a measured variable. However, it will be 




It is a difficult task to analyze some mechanisms, such as corrosion and aging, which are 
affected by many parameters. To implement corrosion and aging related hazard scenarios 
in the FSN, thickness and oxidation sensors have to be installed according to standards. 
Extracted data from the sensor has to be analyzed to uncover the inter-relation pattern 
among wall thickness and other flow parameters such as pressure, temperature and flow 
rate. 
 
7.1. Potential Applications 
 
During the development of the proposed method, an effort has been made to maintain the 
generality as much as possible. As a consequence of this effort, the proposed method is 
envisioned to solve a wide range of problems. Application of this study is not limited to 
LNG or chemical processing plants; however, the FSN would solve a variety of problems 
in different industrial processing plants and mechanical systems. Some of these 
applications are already started and implemented in the ESCL at UOIT as presented in 
this chapter and in Appendix D.  
 
7.1.1. Risk Calculation 
 
In the FSN, nodes correspond to different process variables/faults/causes/consequences 
and directed arcs are links between the nodes that describe the dependencies and any 
node associated with its risk value. Therefore, it is possible to calculate risks of any 
occurring failure or accident. 
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7.1.2. Safety Performance Indicator 
 
Considerable work was done during the study for developing an indicator that shows 
safety performance index, which gives the possibility to include the Safety Performance 
Index (SPI) in the FSN, so it can dynamically show the effectiveness of a safety system 
in a plant as the SPI consists of two main phases that analyze the effectiveness of the 
safety system.  
 Predictive actions analysis is the first phase that analyzes in installed safety 
system in a plant. It includes a database that consists of all possible safety 
barriers (best practice) for each equipment, its associated failure modes and 
risk reduction factor. It shows how effectively the safety system can reduce 
probability of occurrence of an undesired event.    
 Proactive actions analysis is the second phase of the SPI that analyzes 
consequences of an undesired event from an occupational safety point of view.  
 
7.1.3. Applications in Automated Hazard Identification 
 
Analysis of industrial data sets is an important issue in the industries, especially when 
seen from the point of view of safety issues. Identifying hazards and predicting incidents 
and accidents ensures the processes operate under safe conditions and prevents any 
deficiencies or mal-operation. Detecting inter-relation pattern between variables 
quantitatively, followed by an accurate fault propagation analysis in an intelligent way, 
would be a major step in reaching the aim of Automated Hazard Identification. The FSN 
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is a great technique to model a system and processes as a semantic network. Once the 
inter-relation pattern is uncovered and the FSN built, the basic needs of hazard 
identification implementation will be met as the FSN allows finding the cause, which is a 
manipulated variable; the root cause, which is the disturbances and consequence, which is 
the measured variable and failure modes. Such information helps operators to act 
effectively in any faulty and/or critical situation. 
 
7.2. Future Work 
 
Application of the FSN in fault propagation analysis and hazard identification in a 
chemical process is demonstrated through FDS analysis and TE process simulation. To 
further demonstrate its application, the ESCL at UOIT plans to perform the FSN on LNG, 
hydrogen production process plant through the simulation. 
Application of the FSN in fault propagation analysis is demonstrated in this study. As 
described in a previous chapter, FSN is the main module of automated hazard 
identification. Given that implementing automated hazard identification in chemical 
processes is the work that the ESCL considered as future work, as some parts of the work 
are discussed in Hossaini and Gabbar (2011). Fault identification of the sensor, used for 





7.2.1. Application of Automated hazard Identification in 
Hydrogen Production Processing Plant CU-Cl Cycle 
 
Implementing automated hazard identification in a hydrogen production process plant 
built at the Clean Energy Research Laboratory (CERL) at UOIT is another goal of the 
ESCL as discussed in the work of Hossaini and Gabbar (2011). The schematic view of 
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A. List of Abbreviations 
 
2PP  2 Part Predicate 
ANOVA ANalysis of VArinace 
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation  
BBN  Bayesian Belief Network 
CBC  Canadian Broadcasting Corporation  
CBS  Columbia Broadcasting System 
CCPS  Center for Chemical Process Safety 
CFD  Computational Fluid Dynamics 
DCS  Digital Computer System 
DET  Detection 
DPCA  Dynamic Principle Component Analysis  
EE  Equation Error 
EIV  Errors in Variables 
EKF  Extended Kalman Filter 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
ERS   Emergency Response Systems 
ESS   Emergency Shutdown Systems 
ETA   Event Tree Analysis 
EUC   Equipment Under Control 
EWMA  Exponentially Weighted Moving Average 
FCM  Fuzzy C Means 
FDI  Fault detection and identification 
FDI  Fault Detection and Isolation 
FDS  Fault diagnostic system  
FES  Fuzzy Expert System 
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FFC  Fuzzy Faults Classifier 
FIS   Fuzzy Inference System 
FMEA   Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FTA   Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP  Hazard and Operability Analysis 
HIR   Hazard Isolation Rate 
HMR   Hazard Mitigation Rate 
HRR   Hazard Resistance Rate 
HSE   British Health and Safety Executive 
IEC   International Electro-technical Commission 
ISA    Instrumentation, Systems and Automation 
ISS   Inherent Safety Systems 
LCL   Lower Control Limit 
LCV  Level Control Valve 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
LOPA  Layers of Protection Analysis  
LPG   Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
MDL  Minimum Description Length 
MPa  Mega Pascal 
NCBI  National Center for Biotechnology Information 
NMPC  Nonlinear Model Predictive Control 
NPSH   Net Positive Suction Head 
OCC   Occurrence 
ODBC  Open Database Connectivity 
OSHA  Operational Safety and Health Administration  
P&ID  Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
PBD  Process Block Diagrams 
PCA  Principal Component Analysis 
PFD  Probability of Failure on Demand 
PFD  Process Flow Diagram 
POOM  Process Object Oriented Modelling 
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PRAT   Proportional Risk Assessment Technique 
PSM   Process Safety Management 
PVC  Poly Vinyl Chloride 
QRA  Quantitative Risk Assessment 
RDBMS Relational Database Management System 
RPN   Risk Priority Number 
RRF  Risk Reduction Factor 
SEV   Severity 
SIL   Safety Integrity Level 
SIS   Safety Instrumented Systems 
SLC   Safety Life Cycle 
SOC   Safe Operating Conditions 
SPC   Statistical Process Control 
SPI  Safety Performance Index 
SRS   Safety Related Systems 
TR   Threshold Risk 
TRA   Total Risk Associated 
UCL   Upper Control Limit 
UML  Unified Modelling Language 
UOC   Unsafe Operating Conditions 





1. States and Signals 
Disturbance: An unknown and uncontrolled input acting on a system. 
Error: A deviation between a measured or computed value of an output variable 
which is true or theoretically correct. 
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Failure: A permanent interruption of a system's ability to perform a required 
function under specified operating conditions. 
Fault: An unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property or parameter 
of the system from the acceptable, usual or standard condition. 
Malfunction: An intermittent irregularity in the fulfillment of a system's desired 
function. 
Residual: A fault indicator, based on a deviation between measurements and 
model-equation based computations. 
Symptom: A change of an observable quantity from normal behavior. 
 
2. Functions 
Fault detection: Determination of faults present in a system and the time of 
detection. 
Fault isolation: Determination of the kind, location and time of detection of a fault. 
Follows fault detection. 
Fault identification: Determination of the size and time-variant behavior of a fault. 
Follows fault isolation. 
Fault diagnosis: Determination of the kind, size, location and time of detection of a 
fault. Follows fault detection. Includes fault detection and identification. 
Monitoring: A continuous real-time task of determining the conditions of a 
physical system, by recording information, recognizing and indicating anomalies in 
the behaviour. 
Supervision: Monitoring a physical operation and taking appropriate actions to 





Quantitative model: Use of static and dynamic relations among system variables 
and parameters in order to describe a system's behavior in quantitative 
mathematical terms. 
Qualitative model: Use of static and dynamic relations among system variables in 
order to describe a system's behavior in qualitative terms such as causalities and if-
then rules. 
Diagnostic model: A set of static or dynamic relations which link specific input 
variables, the symptoms, to specific output variables, the faults. 
Analytical redundancy: Use of more (not necessarily identical) ways to determine 
a variable, where one way uses a mathematical process model in analytical form. 
 
4. System properties 
Reliability: Ability of a system to perform a required function under stated 
conditions, within a given scope, during a given period of time. 
Safety: Ability of a system not to cause danger to persons, equipment or the 
environment. 
Availability: Probability that a system or equipment will operate satisfactorily and 
effectively at any point of time. 
 
5. Time dependency of faults 
Abrupt fault: Fault modeled as a stepwise function. Represents bias in the 
monitored signal. 




Intermittent fault: Combination of impulses with different amplitudes. 
 
6. Fault typology 
Additive fault: Influences a variable by an addition of the fault itself. They may 
represent, for example, offsets of sensors. 
Multiplicative fault: Represented by the product of a variable with the fault itself. 





Clayton Copula: In probability theories and statistics, a copula is a kind of distribution 
function. Copulas are used to describe the dependence between random variables. They 
are named for their resemblance to grammatical copulas in linguistics. The bivariate 
copula model proposed by Clayton is known as Clayton Copula. It is one of the common 
bivariate copula models. It is also referred to as the Cook and Johnson Copula, originally 
studied by Kimeldorf and Sampson (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). It takes the form: 
 C(µ1, µ2; θ) = (µ1−θ + µ2−θ −1)−1/θ    [D.1] 
 where 
Domain of dependence parameter θ = {θ | 0 < θ < ∞ } = (0, ∞)  
As θ approaches zero, the marginals become independent. As θ approaches infinity, the 
copula attains the Fréchet upper bound, but for no value does it attain the Fréchet lower 
bound. The Clayton Copula cannot account for negative dependence. It has been used to 
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study correlated risks because it exhibits strong left tail dependence and relatively weak 
right tail dependence (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). 
Fault Semantic Network (FNS): A set of term-tokens linked by a set of predicate-
tokens for the purpose of fault diagnosis. 
K2 algorithm pseudo code: 
1. Procedure K2 
2. {Input: A set of n nodes, an ordering on the nodes, an upper bound u on the 
3.  number of parents a node may have, and a database D containing m cases.} 
4. {Output: For each node, a printout of the parents of the node.} 
5. for i: := 1 to n do 
6.  πi := 0; 
7. Pold := g(, πi); {This function is computed using equation (12).} 
8.  OKToProceed := true 
9.  while OKToProceed and |πi| < u do 
10.   let z be the node in Pred(xi) − πi that maximizes g(i, πi U {z}); 
Pnew := g(i, πi U  {z}); 
12.  if Pnew > Pold then 
13.   Pold := Pnew; 
14.   πi := πi U {z} 
15.   else OKToProceed := false; 
16.  end {while}; 
17. writefNode:', xh 'Parents of this node:', TT,) 
18. end {for}; 
19. end {K2}; 
Project Object Oriented Methodology (POOM): An object oriented approach to 
construct a process model in its static, dynamic or functional paradigms. In a static 
paradigm, the faults are related with structures of machines such as pumps, valves or 
compressors. In a dynamic paradigm, the faults are related with the dynamic behaviour of 
machines such as over-loading, saturation or overheating. In a functional paradigm, the 
128 
 
faults are related with the operation of machines such as start-up, shutdown or wrong 
operation. 
Semantic Network (SN): A set of term-tokens linked by a set of predicate-tokens. 
 
D. Fault Diagnostic System 
 
An experimental setup was assembled in the Energy, Safety and Control Laboratory 
(ESCL), at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT), Oshawa, Canada, 
by a research team, which was assigned to set up a P&ID and obtain the real life data.  In 
this section, analysis is performed on the acquired data. Photographs of the P&ID is 
shown in Figure D.1. 
 
 
a) Initial setup of FDS. 
 
b) Upgraded setup. 
 
Figure D.1: An experimental setup of an FDS in the ESCL 
 
The purpose of this setup is to observe relationships between the process variables and 
hazards. In the initial setup, carbon steel pipes and carbon steel tanks were used. In the 
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upgraded setup, poly-carbon tanks and poly vinyl chloride (PVC) pipes are used. Flow 
meters, vibration sensors, surface temperature sensors and infrared temperature sensors 
are used for input signals. For controlling the flow of liquid in different directions, signals 
are fed from the computer. Computer programs are developed to send output signals and 
to record the input signals. The location of the sensors and the control signal feeds are 
shown in Figure D.2. 
 
Figure D.2: Location of the sensors and other equipment of the 
experimental setup in the ESCL 
 
Data was collected from the initial experimental setup. Multiple sets of data were 
collected by changing different process variables. Data was captured at six second 
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intervals. The first set of data was not used for analysis, as it was not recorded properly. 
Change of temperature, pressure and vibration were recorded with the change of different 
parameters. The data is plotted using MATLAB® and analyzed with Microsoft Excel and 
Orange, a statistical analyzing software. 
In Figure D.3 data set 8 is plotted. In this experiment, all three valves were half opened. 
The flow from tank-1 to tank-2 was much higher because the pump was exerting more 
pressure from tank-1 to tank-2 than the gravitational pressure from tank-2 to tank-1. 
 
 
Figure D.3: Temperature change of different components and 
variation of level & flow of water 
 
D.1. Statistical Visualization 
In this section, descriptive statistics are used to visualize the data. Orange was used to 
plot the data. In Figure D.4, the mean and median temperature, the co-relation between 
a) Temperature increase of different 
components over time 
 
b) Variation of water level in 
tank-1 and tank-2 over time 
 
 
c) Flow of water through 
flow rate measurement 
F-4 
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the temperature profiles, and the level of temperatures of the different components are 
visualized. 
 
a) Maximum, minimum, 






b) Co-relation between the 
temperature profiles of pump, 






c) Level of temperatures of 
pump, valve 1, 2 & 3, and 
tank 1 & 2. 
 
Figure D.4: Temperature profile of different components during the 
experiment 
 
In Figure D.5, the co-relation between the temperature profiles and level of temperatures 
of the different components are visualized. In Figure D.5.a) the relationship of 
temperature of one component with another is shown by the connecting lines. In Figure 
D.5.b), the clusters of temperatures are shown. In Figure D.5.c), components with a 








a) Correlation between the 
temperature profiles of pump, 





b) Level of temperatures of 
pump, valve 1, 2 & 3, and 
tank 1 & 2 
 
c) Correlation between the 
temperature profiles of valve 
1 and tank 1 
 
Figure D.5: Relationships between the temperatures of different components 
 
D.2. Regression Analysis of the Data from FDS 
In this analysis, prediction of one event, based on one or more events, has been shown. 
Linear regression in Microsoft Excel has been used to analyze the data. Prediction of 
temperature changes in tank-1 was taken as a test case. From the acquired data, the 
temperature of tank-1 has been predicted using the pump temperature and tank-2 
temperature. Temperature prediction can also be attained based on all of the variables. 






Table D.1: Regression Summary 
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.6512 
R Square 0.4240 
Adjusted R Square 0.4183 
Standard Error 0.3070 
Observations 204 
 
Table D.2: Analysis of Variance 
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 13.946 6.973 73.988 8.32E-25 
Residual 201 18.944 0.094     




In the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Table D.2, the attribute “Significance” is the 
goodness of fit. For this regression the value of Significance is 8.32×10−25, i.e. close to 
zero, that means the regression is almost a perfect fit (Gupta, 2000). The Adjusted R 
Square in Table D.1 is also a measurement of the goodness of fit, which is 41.83%. The 
higher it is, the better it is. The Sum of Squares (SS) are the deviation of the data. Total 
SS (TSS) is the total of all sums of squares. Smaller the TSS, the better the result (Gupta, 
2000). 
In Figure D.6, the probability of a certain level of temperature in tank-1 is shown. For 




Figure D.6: Normal probability plot 
 
The coefficients column in Table D.3 is needed to determine the trend line for all the 
independent variables. The dependent variable is the temperature of tank-1 (Tt1). The 
intercept is 28.049. 
 
Table D.3: The intercept and coefficients of linear regression 
  Coefficients 
Standard 





Intercept 28.049 3.552 7.896 0.000 21.045 35.054 
Pump [°C] 1.059 0.133 7.948 0.000 0.796 1.322 
Tank 2 [°C] -1.173 0.107 -10.955 0.000 -1.384 -0.962 
 
 
The line for tank-1 temperature vs. pump-1 temperature and tank-2 temperature is: 
Tt1 = β0 + β1Pt + β2Tt2 
where β0 = intercept 
β1 = first coefficient 






























































The equation of the line is:  Tt1 = 28.049 + 1.059·Pt  – 1.173·Tt2 [D.2] 
Test case: 
 when  
  Pump temperature Pt = 23.625 °C 
  Tank-2 temperature Tt2 = 24.125 °C 
 The predicted temperature of tank-1: 
Tt1 = 28.049 + 1.059·(23.625)  – 1.173·(24.125)  [°C] 
      = 24.769 °C 
The actual temperature is 24.563 
The difference is 0.206 °C;  i.e. 0.81% is acceptable in regard to this FDS system. 
 
In Figure D.7, the predicted temperature of tank-1, based on the temperature of tank-2, is 
shown in maroon colour. The actual temperature of tank-1 is shown in blue colour. For 
example if the temperature of tank-2 is 24.5 °C then the actual temperature of tank-1 is 






Figure D.7: Temperature of tank-1, predicted based on temperature of tank-2 
 
E. Additional Plots of the FDS Data 
 
Multiple sets of data were recorded, changing different parameters. Data was captured at 
six second intervals. The change of temperature, pressure and vibration were recorded, 
with the change of different parameters. A total eight sets of data were recorded from 
nine experimental runs. Data from the first run was discarded. In Figure E.1, data set-1 is 
plotted. In the plots it can be observed that the level of tank-2 has not changed, but the 
level of tank-1 first decreased and then increased. This is because valve-1 (Ctrl-2) was 
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a) Temperature increase of different 
components over time when valve-1 is closed 
 
 
b) Variation of water level in tank-1 and 
tank-2 to over time 
 
Figure E.1: Temperature profile of different components 
and water levels in the tanks, data set-1 
 
In Figure E.2, data set-2 is plotted. In this run, valve-2 (Ctrl-3) was closed. The level of 
tank-2 did not change. The level of tank-1 decreased, stayed low for some time, then rose 
again. The temperature of valve-1 spiked at about 430 seconds into the experiment, then 
decreased again. 
 



























































a) Temperature increase of different 




b) Variation of water level in tank-1 and 
tank-2 to over time 
 
Figure E.2: Variation of water level in the tanks and temperature 
profile of components, data set-2 
 
In Figure E.3, data set-3 is plotted. In this experiment, valve-3 (Ctrl-4) was closed when 
the pump (Ctrl-1) was running. When the pump stopped, the valve was opened, and as a 
result tank-2 was filled first, emptying tank-1 and then drained to tank-1 emptying tank-2. 
The temperature of tank-1 decreased. 
 
 






















































a) Temperature increase of 
different components over time 
 
b) Variation of water level in 
tank-1 and tank-2 over time 
 
c) Flow of water through 
flow rate measurement F-4 
 
Figure E.3: Temperature change of different components and 
variation of level & flow of water, data set-3 
 
In Figure E.4, data set-4 is plotted. This experiment is a repeat of the previous 
experiment. In this experiment, valve-3 (Ctrl-4) was closed when the pump (Ctrl-1) was 
running. When the pump stopped, the valve was opened, and as a result tank-2 was filled 
first, emptying tank-1 and then drained to tank-1, emptying tank-2. The temperature of 
tank-1 decreased. The temperature of other components showed slightly different trends. 
a) Temperature increase of 
different components over time 
 
 
b) Variation of water level 




c) Flow of water through 
flow rate measurement F-4 
 
Figure E.4: Temperature change of different components and 
variation of level & flow of water, data set-4 








Temperature Profile of Different Components































Levels of the Tanks























Flow from Tank-1 to Tank-2



















Temperature Profile of Different Components































Levels of the Tanks























Flow from Tank-1 to Tank-2












In Figure E.5, the data set-5 is plotted. This experiment is a repeat of the previous 
experiment. In this experiment, valve-3 (Ctrl-4) was closed when the pump (Ctrl-1) was 
running. When the pump stopped, the valve was opened, and as a result tank-2 was filled 
first, emptying tank-1 and then drained to tank-1, emptying tank-2. The temperature of 
tank-1 decreased. The temperature of the other components showed slightly different 
trends. 
 
a) Temperature increase of different 
components over time 
 
 
b) Variation of water level in 
tank-1 and tank-2 over time 
 
 
c) Flow of water through 
flow rate measurement 
F-4 
 
Figure E.5: Temperature change of different components and 
variation of level & flow of water, data set-5 
 
In Figure E.6, data set-6 is plotted. In this experiment, all three valves were half-opened. 
The flow from tank-1 to tank-2 was much higher because the pump was exerting much 
more pressure from tank-1 to tank-2 than the gravitational pressure from tank-2 to tank-1. 
 








Temperature Profile of Different Components































Levels of the Tanks























Flow from Tank-1 to Tank-2












a) Temperature increase of different 
components over time 
 
b) Variation of water level in 
tank-1 and tank-2 over time 
 
 
c) Flow of water through 
flow rate measurement 
F-4 
 
Figure E.6: Temperature change of different components and 
variation of level & flow of water, data set-6 
 
In Figure E.7, data set-7 is plotted. This is a repeat of the previous experiment. In this 
experiment, all three valves were half-opened. The flow from tank-1 to tank-2 was much 
higher because the pump was exerting more pressure from tank-1 to tank-2 than the 
gravitational pressure from tank-2 to tank-1. 
 
a) Temperature increase of different 
components over time 
 
b) Variation of water level in 
tank-1 and tank-2 over time 
 
 
c) Flow of water through 
flow rate measurement 
F-4 
 
Figure E.7: Temperature variation of different components and 
change of level & flow of water, data set-7 
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Flow from Tank-1 to Tank-2



















Temperature Profile of Different Components































Levels of the Tanks























Flow from Tank-1 to Tank-2












F. Sample MATLAB® Program 
 
%---------------------------------------------------- 
% FDS data ploting 
% March 13, 2013 
% Created by Manir U. Isham 
% -------- Declaration of the basic environment----------- 
clf 
format              % Sets format of numerical output to default mode 
clear               % Clears the variables from memory 
clc                 % Clears the screen 
format compact      % Sets the format of numerical output to compact 
mode 
  




c1 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,1); 
c2 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,2); 
c3 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,3); 
c4 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,4); 
c5 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,5); 
c6 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,6); 
c7 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,7); 
c8 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,8); 
c9 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,9); 
c10 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,10); 
c11 = FDS_Bst_Sht_9(:,11); 
  
figure(1) 
plot(c1, c2, c1, c4, c1, c5, c1, c6, c1, c8, c1, c11, 'linewidth', 3) 
title({'Temperature Profile of Different Components',... 
    '(Run-9: All Valves Half Open)'},... 




legend('Tank-1', 'Valve-1', 'Pump', 'Valve-2', 'Tank-2', 'Valve-3') 
  
figure(2) 
plot(c1, c3,'b-', c1, c9, 'r-', 'linewidth', 3) 
ylim([10 30]) 
 
title({'Levels of the Tanks',... 
    '(Run-9: All Valves Half Open)'},... 











title({'Flow from Tank-1 to Tank-2',... 
    '(Run-9: All Valves Half Open)'},... 








G. Sample FSN Macro 
 
Private Sub UserForm_Initialize() 
 
    Dim connstr As Variant 
    Dim counter As Integer 
 
    connstr = connection() 
    Set connecDB = New ADOdb.connection 
    connecDB.Open connstr 
 
counter = 0 
 
    '''''''''''''''Inserts the eq-cl-id and cq-cl-name into the list box 
 
    Set tbleq = New ADOdb.Recordset 
    tbleq.Open "[cl-eq]", connstr, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic, adCmdTable 
    List_eq_class.Clear 
    If tbleq.BOF And tbleq.EOF Then Exit Sub 
        With tbleq 
            'FirstRec = .Bookmark 
        Do Until .EOF 
            List_eq_class.AddItem 
            List_eq_class.Column(0, counter) = ![eq-cl-id] 
            List_eq_class.Column(1, counter) = ![eq-cl-name] 
            counter = counter + 1 
            .MoveNext 
        Loop 
        End With 
     
    Set tbleq = Nothing 
 
    Dim strSQl As String 
    Dim temptbl As ADOdb.Recordset 




    '''''''''''''''Inserts func-id-mn into the parent combo box 
 
    strSQl = "Select DISTINCT [func-id-mn] FROM [cl-func]" 
        temptbl.Open strSQl, connstr, , , adCmdText 
        cmb_parent.Clear 
        Do Until temptbl.EOF 
            cmb_parent.AddItem temptbl("func-id-mn") 
            temptbl.MoveNext 
        Loop 
        Set temptbl = Nothing 
 
        ''''''''''''''' Inserts func-id into the func combo box 
         
        Set tblfunc = New ADOdb.Recordset 
        tblfunc.Open "[cl-func]", connstr, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic, adCmdTable 
        tblfunc.MoveFirst 
        Do Until tblfunc.EOF 
            cmb_funid.AddItem tblfunc![func-id] 
            tblfunc.MoveNext 
        Loop 
        Set tblfunc = Nothing 
 
        '''''''''''''''' Inserts all the pv-id values into the pv value combo box 
        Set tblpv = New ADOdb.Recordset 
        tblpv.Open "[cl-pv]", connstr, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic, adCmdTable 
 
        tblpv.MoveFirst 
 
        Do Until tblpv.EOF 
            cmb_pvid.AddItem tblpv![pv-id] 
            tblpv.MoveNext 
        Loop 
        Set tblpv = Nothing 
 
        '''''''''''''' Inserts all the values into the pv loc combo box 
         
        Set temptbl = New ADOdb.Recordset 
        strSQl = "Select [fm-loc] FROM [cl-fm-loc]" 
        temptbl.Open strSQl, connstr, , , adCmdText 
        cmb_pvloc.Clear 
        Do Until temptbl.EOF 
            cmb_pvloc.AddItem temptbl("fm-loc") 
            temptbl.MoveNext 
        Loop 





        ''''''''''''''''inserts the eq-cl-mn values into the combo box from cl-eq 
 
        Set temptbl = New ADOdb.Recordset 
        strSQl = "Select DISTINCT [eq-cl-mn] FROM [cl-eq]" 
        temptbl.Open strSQl, connstr, , , adCmdText 
        cmb_eqclmn.Clear 
        Do Until temptbl.EOF 
            cmb_eqclmn.AddItem temptbl("eq-cl-mn") 
            temptbl.MoveNext 
        Loop 




H. Sample ESN Macro 
 
Private Sub UserForm_Initialize() 
 
    Dim StrSql As String 
    Call Prjct_Lst 
    Call Flr_Lst 
    Call Flr_Dflt_Val_Lst 
    Ltng_Page_Initialize 
    Call Ltng_Nw_Blb_Typ_Lst 
    Call PV_Clss_Lst 
 
    ' --------------- String for Opening any Table ---------------------- 
    Dim connstr As Variant 
    connstr = DB_Path.DB_Path() 
    Set connecDB = New ADODB.connection 
    connecDB.Open connstr 
    ' --------------------------------------------------------------- 
     
    MultiPage1.Value = 0 
    MultiPage2.Value = 0 
    'TabControl.SelectedIndex = 2 
    Set tmptbl = New ADODB.Recordset 
    StrSql = "SELECT [Lx] FROM [ESN_Tbl_Room] where [Prjct_ID]= 1" 
    tmptbl.Open StrSql, connstr, , , adCmdText 
    If Not tmptbl.BOF And Not tmptbl.EOF Then 
        If Not IsNull(tmptbl("Lx")) Then 
            Ltng_Lx = tmptbl("Lx") 
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        Else 
            Ltng_Lx = 250 
        End If 
    Else 
        Ltng_Lx = 250 
    End If 
    tmptbl.Close 
    Set tmptbl = Nothing 
    connecDB.Close 




Private Sub Prjct_Lst() 
 
                            ' Inserts all the Project name values into the Prjct_Nm and Sl value 
combo box 
 
    Dim counter As Single 
     
    ' --------------- String for Opening any Table ---------------------- 
    Dim connstr As Variant 
    connstr = DB_Path.DB_Path() 
    Set connecDB = New ADODB.connection 
    connecDB.Open connstr 
    ' --------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
    counter = 0 
 
    Set Tbl_Pid = New ADODB.Recordset 
    Tbl_Pid.Open "[ESN_Tbl_Prjct]", connstr, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic, 
adCmdTable 
 
    If Not Tbl_Pid.BOF And Not Tbl_Pid.EOF Then 
        Do Until Tbl_Pid.EOF 
            Frm_Prjct_Nm.AddItem Tbl_Pid![Prjct_Nm] 
         
            If counter = 1 Then 
                'Frm_Prjct_Id.Caption = Tbl_Pid("Prjct_Id") 
            End If 
     
            counter = counter + 1 
            Tbl_Pid.MoveNext 
        Loop 
     
        Frm_Prjct_Nm.ListIndex = 1 
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    End If 
 
    'counter = 0 
    Tbl_Pid.Close 
    Set Tbl_Pid = Nothing 
    connecDB.Close 





' ================ Floor Page ========================= 
 
Private Sub Flr_Lst() 
 
    ' --------------- String for Opening any Table ---------------------- 
 
    Dim connstr As Variant 
    connstr = DB_Path.DB_Path() 
    Set connecDB = New ADODB.connection 
    connecDB.Open connstr 
    ' --------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Flr_Flr.Clear 
    Rm_Flr.Clear 
    Ltng_Flr.Clear 
    Htng_Flr.Clear 
    Colng_Flr.Clear 
    Eqpmnt_Flr.Clear 
    Enrgy_Flr_Flr.Clear 
    Enrgy_Rm_Flr.Clear 
     
    Set temptbl = New ADODB.Recordset 
    StrSql = "Select DISTINCT [eq-lev] FROM [fclty-eq]" 
    temptbl.Open StrSql, connstr, , , adCmdText 
    If Not temptbl.BOF And Not temptbl.EOF Then 
        Do Until temptbl.EOF 
            Flr_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            Rm_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            Ltng_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            Htng_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            Colng_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            Eqpmnt_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            Enrgy_Flr_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            Enrgy_Rm_Flr.AddItem temptbl("eq-lev") 
            temptbl.MoveNext 
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        Loop 
    End If 
    Flr_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
    Rm_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
    Ltng_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
    Htng_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
    Colng_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
    Eqpmnt_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
    Enrgy_Flr_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
    Enrgy_Rm_Flr.ListIndex = 0 
     
    temptbl.Close 
    Set temptbl = Nothing 
    connecDB.Close 
    Set connstr = Nothing 
 
End Sub 
